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Antitrust Law’s Harm to Competition: 
A New Understanding of Exclusivity 
ITTAI PALDOR† 
One of the long-accepted axioms of antitrust law is that 
the competitive danger posed by exclusivity agreements 
increases as the market share foreclosed by these 
arrangements increases. The larger the market share 
foreclosed by an exclusivity agreement, the less likely the 
arrangement is to be upheld by courts. And exclusivity 
arrangements foreclosing extremely large market shares are 
practically never upheld. The business community has 
responded by forsaking such arrangements (or concealing 
them). This Article challenges this very intuitive axiom. It 
shows that due to an unobserved feature of exclusivity, when 
extremely large market shares are foreclosed, the competitive 
danger posed by these arrangements decreases. Exclusivity 
arrangements foreclosing market shares of 85% and higher 
should be presumed competitively benign, and therefore legal. 
Several illustrative examples of industries, in which 
widespread exclusivity should be allowed in contradiction to 
the current understanding, are provided. The analysis 
 
†Assistant Professor, Hebrew University Faculty of Law (SJD, University of 
Toronto, Faculty of Law). I am greatly indebted to participants of the European 
Association of Law and Economics 2019 Annual Conference and participants of 
the Hebrew University Law Faculty Seminar for extremely helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this Article. Bar Buaron and Asor Weizman provided 
invaluable research assistance. All errors remain my own. 
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developed in this Article suggests that for decades antitrust 
law has been decreasing welfare by forcing businesses to steer 
clear of a welfare-enhancing practice. The Article calls for a 
change of this paradigm. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, the Delaware District Court was motioned to 
summarily dismiss an antitrust claim in Roxul v. 
Armstrong.1 The plaintiff, a manufacturer of ceiling tiles, 
alleged that defendant, a competing manufacturer of ceiling 
tiles, had inhibited the growth of the plaintiff’s business by 
signing exclusivity arrangements with key distributors. 
Plaintiff explained that distributors were a critical channel 
in the sale of ceiling tiles.2 Building constructors, who are the 
end consumers of tiles, seldom buy tiles from any source 
other than distributors, because distributors offer a wide 
range of additional products and services.3 Manufacturers 
therefore have no viable alternative to distributors, and tiles 
are sold almost exclusively through distributors. Plaintiff 
also claimed that there were very few distributors qualified 
to distribute ceiling tiles.4 Defendant had signed exclusivity 
contracts with the key distributors,5 thereby retarding the 
growth of plaintiff’s business, as well as that of other tile 
manufacturers. As a result, defendant was able to charge 
more than 5% over competitive prices.6 Taking these 
allegations to be true (as the court must when summary 
 
 1. Roxul USA, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. 17-1258, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21513, at *3–4 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2018). 
 2. Id. at *13. 
 3. Such as logistical planning, same-day delivery, other services, and 
additional building products. Id. at *13–14. 
 4. Id. at *1, *13–14; see also id. at *3 (“Due to market forces, regional and 
national distributors have consolidated resulting in limited numbers of 
distributors capable of servicing [plaintiff] and [defendant].”). 
 5. Id. at *12–13. 
 6. Id. at *4. 
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dismissal is sought),7 the court sided with plaintiff. 
A year later, in 2019, the court denied defendant’s 
motion to preclude an expert opinion submitted on behalf of 
the plaintiff.8 The court again sided with the plaintiff, 
finding that the assertions made in the expert opinion were 
sufficient to be brought before a jury. Specifically, the court 
found that an argument according to which the most efficient 
(and largest) distributors had been foreclosed to competitors 
constituted a sufficient allegation of competitive harm.9 
In line with current antitrust theory and prevailing 
antitrust law, both decisions were handed down without any 
attempt to address a question that begs itself under the 
circumstances: If the foreclosed distributors are indeed 
indispensable from tile manufacturers’ perspectives, be it 
because they are large, efficient, or for any other reason, why 
did they agree to participate in a scheme that ultimately 
resulted in higher prices charged to them? Would they not 
have been better off turning down defendant’s exclusivity 
offer? Surely, a refusal to grant exclusivity would have left 
them with the choice of buying from any of several tile 
manufacturers competing with each other. If the foreclosed 
distributors can indeed bestow market power on, or withhold 
market power from manufacturers (otherwise the 
agreements in question would have been competitively 
benign), distributors’ acquiescence is puzzling. They 
willingly retarded competition at the manufacturers’ level 
only to find themselves contractually obligated to purchase 
exclusively from a seller who then charged them higher 
prices. 
An intuitive explanation for distributors’ acquiescence 
would be a straightforward one—payment. The distributors 
 
 7. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 
972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 8. Roxul USA, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. 17-1258, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37925, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2019). 
 9. Id. at *11. 
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may have received consideration from the defendant 
manufacturer in return for agreeing to the exclusivity 
clauses. 
But despite its intuitive appeal, this explanation is 
unsatisfactory. The reason is that it requires a collective 
action problem amongst distributors, which, under the 
circumstances alleged by plaintiff, would have been 
extremely unlikely, if not impossible. A detailed explanation 
of the collective action problem that is a prerequisite for this 
scenario is provided subsequently.10 Very briefly, it has long 
been observed that anti-competitive exclusivity—exclusivity 
that enhances a contracting party’s market power—is, in the 
context discussed here, a zero-sum game. Any additional 
dollar of profit that will accrue to one party as a result of its 
newly-acquired market power will come at the expense of its 
contractual counterpart. This, as will be explained, holds not 
only when the agreement is struck between a seller and an 
end consumer, but also when the parties are a wholesaler 
and a retailer. Any profits accruing to the manufacturer as a 
result of anti-competitive exclusivity will necessarily harm 
the retailer. Importantly, the harm incurred by the retailer 
will be precisely equal to the manufacturer’s gains from anti-
competitive exclusivity. A mutually beneficial arrangement 
whereby the manufacturer is granted market power and 
distributors (as a group) profit from the arrangement is—
under this theory of competitive harm—impossible. This 
understanding is neither novel nor controversial. It dates 
back many years.11 
 
 10. See infra Section II.B. 
 11. The understanding is in fact the result of a debate, in which members of 
the Chicago School initially argued that exclusivity can never produce an anti-
competitive outcome. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 203–05 (1976), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 306–07 (1978), with Louis Kaplow & Carl 
Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1072, at 1204–05 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). There are also other anti-
competitive explanations for exclusivity, but these are more limited in scope, and 
more controversial. As Kaplow & Shapiro point out, the presence of multiple 
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If distributors face a collective action problem, some of 
them may agree to grant the manufacturer exclusivity, 
thereby securing the manufacturer’s dominant position.12 
But under the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff in Roxul 
v. Armstrong, in which there were only a few key distributors 
(and apparently two large ones)13 who could withhold the 
dominant position from, or bestow it upon, the manufacturer, 
a collective action problem is unlikely. 
As implausible as a collective action problem is under the 
circumstances alleged by that plaintiff, this is not the key 
point in the current context. Importantly for current 
purposes, the court found no need to address these issues. In 
line with the current understanding of exclusivity, the court 
assumed that exclusivity agreements foreclosing a large 
market share to competitors were more likely to harm 
competition.14 Although the theoretical foundation for the 
understanding of exclusivity is not new, its practical 
implications have thus far been overlooked. Courts and 
commentators continue to assume that exclusivity 
arrangements foreclosing large market shares are likely to 
harm competition. 
It is this intuitive assumption that the current Article 
challenges. The challenge launched in this Article does not 
suggest that exclusivity arrangements never carry any anti-
competitive potential. They definitely do. But paradoxically, 
when extremely large market shares are foreclosed, the 
 
buyers that leads to a free rider problem is “the factor that is probably most 
important in antitrust challenges to exclusive dealing.” Louis Kaplow & Carl 
Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1072, at 1204 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). For a survey of other 
explanations, see id. at 1205–09 (focusing on the explanation developed in 
Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as Barriers to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. 
REV. 388 (1987)). Note, however, that many settings in which exclusivity 
contracts will increase the costs of entry under this explanation will not result in 
harm to consumers. 
 12. See infra Section II.B. 
 13. Roxul, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37925, at *11–12. 
 14. Id. at *9–10, *13–14. 
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market share foreclosed does not exacerbate the anti-
competitive potential, but rather becomes a safeguard 
against exclusivity’s anti-competitive potential. This feature 
of exclusivity arrangements has, until now, been overlooked. 
Yet it has important policy implications. 
Exclusive dealing agreements are a widespread and 
long-standing business practice.15 Such arrangements have 
mixed welfare effects: On the one hand, they may generate 
various cost-savings in production and distribution,16 which 
in turn result in lower prices and increased output, an 
undeniably welfare-enhancing effect.17 On the other hand, 
they restrict competitors’ access to supply sources or 
distribution outlets. If enough outlets are foreclosed, 
exclusivity arrangements may exclude competitors from the 
market altogether. This, in turn, may enhance or entrench 
the market power of the party being granted exclusivity, 
thereby enabling that party to elevate prices and restrict 
output, resulting in the deadweight loss that is the hallmark 
of market power’s exertion.18 
As exclusivity arrangements have both welfare-
enhancing and welfare-reducing (anti-competitive) effects, 
their legality is subject to the rule of reason analysis,19 which 
calls for a balancing of their welfare-enhancing effects 
against their anti-competitive effects under the specific 
market circumstances.20 If the former outweigh the latter, 
 
 15. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and 
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 314 (2002). For other early cases, see id. 
at 314 n.8. For an early (documented) case, see Gale v. Reed (1806) 103 Eng. Rep. 
274 (KB). 
 16. See infra Section II.A. 
 17. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 122 (2d ed. 1998). 
 18. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 3–15 (5th ed. 2016). 
 19. Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 20. Standard Oil Company of California v. United States (Standard Stations), 
337 U.S. 293 (1949), is regularly cited as the authority under which exclusivity 
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the arrangement under scrutiny is upheld. If the opposite is 
the case, the arrangement is struck down. 
Within the framework of the rule of reason, the market 
share of the contracting parties is, and has long been, a key 
criterion for identifying whether the arrangement at hand is 
benign or anti-competitive.21 The importance of the 
percentage of the market foreclosed is intuitive: the greater 
the share of the market foreclosed, the less alternatives a 
competitor (of the party being granted exclusivity) has from 
whom she can purchase, or to whom she can sell.22 
Consequently, competitors may be driven out of the 
market.23 It would thus seem that the competitive danger 
raised by exclusivity arrangements increases as the 
percentage of the market foreclosed increases. Factors other 
 
arrangements are subject to the rule of reason. See, e.g., Recent Developments, 
Tying Agreements and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements before the Courts and the 
FTC, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562 n.15 (1955) [hereinafter Tying and Exclusivity]. 
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 319, points out that the issue was initially settled 
almost a quarter of a century earlier in FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 
463 (1923). But it should be noted that while the court in Sinclair was 
undoubtedly sympathetic to the contract, the contract at bar had not explicitly 
prohibited retailers from dealing with competing manufacturers. For an account 
of the application of the rule of reason in general, see Richard A. Posner, The Next 
Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981). 
 21. See cases cited infra note 25–26. 
 22. Exclusive dealing arrangements may be exclusive supply agreements, 
whereby a seller (or sellers) agrees to supply exclusively to a single purchaser, 
and they may be exclusive purchasing agreements, whereby a buyer (or buyers) 
agree to purchase exclusively from a single supplier. See Commission Regulation 
2790/99 of 22 Dec. 1999 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, art. 1(c), 1999 O.J. 
(L 336) 21; Commission Regulation 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 
1983 O.J. (L 173) 5. Throughout the remainder of this Article, I normally use the 
more intuitive example of exclusive purchasing agreements. The argument 
pressed in this Article is, however, equally valid in the setting of exclusive supply 
agreements. 
 23. The focus on the disadvantage at which competitors are placed in 
comparison to the incumbent as the key element of the analysis follows the 
understanding of barriers to entry originating in JOE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW 
COMPETITION (1952). For a discussion of the application of this understanding in 
the context of exclusivity, see sources cited infra note 110. 
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than the percentage of foreclosure, such as the number of 
barriers to entry, are of course also relevant. But the 
competitive danger nonetheless largely depends on the 
percentage of foreclosure. 
Current antitrust theory and law view the competitive 
danger associated with exclusivity agreements as a 
continuum.24 At one end are exclusivity commitments 
granted by firms with trivial market shares, which raise no 
real competitive concern. At the other extreme are 
exclusivity commitments granted by firms with significant 
market shares, which rightly raise concern. This concern 
may be outweighed by pro-competitive effects, but it 
definitely exists. And the larger the foreclosed share, the 
greater the pro-competitive effects that are required to offset 
the competitive harm if the agreement is to be upheld. 
Approvals of exclusivity arrangements in which the 
foreclosed market share is larger than approximately 70% 
are essentially nonexistent.25 Courts have emphasized time 
and again that such large foreclosure almost invariably 
implicates the agreements as anti-competitive.26 
 
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. See, e.g., Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (dismissing motion for summary judgment, although nothing 
but information on the foreclosed market share was alleged to support 
competitive harm brought about by exclusives); Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise 
Corp. v. Super. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of S.F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 650 (Ct. App. 
2003) (making an even more extreme argument, citing authority for the 
proposition that courts “routinely condemn” foreclosure meeting a 50% 
threshold); ZF Meritor, L.L.C. v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(dismissing motion for summary judgment); Maxon Hyundai Mazda v. Carfax, 
Inc., No. 13-CV-2680 (AJN), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139480, at *269 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2014). 
 26. The court in Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services, a case upholding 
exclusives, indicated that it would have been less sympathetic to the exclusives 
had the market share foreclosed been extreme: “Where the degree of foreclosure 
caused by the exclusivity provisions is so great that it invariably indicates that 
the supplier imposing the provisions has substantial market power, we may rely 
on the foreclosure rate alone to establish the violation.” 823 F.2d 1215, 1233 (8th 
Cir. 1987). Closely related in the context of the focus on market shares (although 
distinct from an economic perspective) are cases in which the firm being granted 
exclusivity is a monopoly or holds a significant market share. Such arrangements 
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This Article challenges the prevailing view. It shows that 
despite intuition, when exclusivity is granted by a firm or 
firms with extremely large market shares, economic theory 
suggests that competitive harm is unlikely, and very often 
entirely impossible, at least under the main theory of 
competitive harm. When the percentage of foreclosure is 
relatively small, its anti-competitive potential indeed 
increases with the percentage of foreclosure. Foreclosure of 
30% is indeed more likely to harm competition than 
foreclosure of 20%; foreclosure of 40% is more likely to be 
anti-competitive than foreclosure of 30%, and so on. The anti-
competitive impact continues to increase as the market share 
foreclosed increases, until a threshold of approximately 85% 
to 90% is reached. But when the percentage of foreclosure 
exceeds this threshold, the positive correlation between the 
percentage of foreclosure and the competitive danger no 
longer exists. In fact, it is reversed. The large percentage 
becomes a safeguard against the use of exclusivity to 
enhance or entrench market power.27 
This analysis has paradigm-changing policy 
implications. Surprisingly, exclusivity arrangements 
resulting in foreclosure of extremely large market shares 
should be treated more leniently than arrangements 
 
too are regularly struck down. See United States v. Greenhut (In re Corning), 51 
F. 205, 207–08 (N.D. Ohio 1892) )the firm being granted exclusivity was actually 
a member of a horizontal combination of several defendants, but a combination 
formed prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. 
United States, 258 U.S. 451, 464–65 (1922); Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342 
U.S. 143, 156–57 (1951); FTC v. Motion Pictures Advert. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 392 
(1953) (note, however, that the 75% market share was held by four companies, 
who all had exclusivity arrangements in place); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 239–40 (1st Cir. 1983); Omega Env’t, Inc. v. 
Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1997). In the landmark Tampa 
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., subsequently discussed, the court ruled that 
market share alone is insufficient as a conclusive indication of competitive harm. 
365 U.S. 320, 328 (1961). Consequently, courts generally refer to additional 
indicia as well. Nonetheless, despite the rhetoric, the outcome remains the same: 
courts essentially never uphold exclusivity arrangements foreclosing large 
market shares. 
 27. The terms “large” and “small” are quantified infra Part 0. 
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foreclosing significant (but smaller) market shares. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. 
Part I briefly reviews the legal treatment of exclusivity. Part 
II reviews the potential welfare-enhancing and welfare-
reducing effects of exclusivity. Specifically, this Part of the 
Article offers insight into the key prerequisite for anti-
competitive exclusivity under the widely accepted theory of 
competitive harm—a collective action problem at the link in 
the chain of production granting exclusivity. Part III 
develops the concept of “monopoly-over-monopoly status,” 
explaining why exclusivity is unlikely to be anti-competitive 
when very large market shares are foreclosed. This Part also 
provides several useful examples of real-life industries in 
which, contrary to common wisdom, exclusivity should be 
presumed benign. Part IV derives a practical rule based on 
empirical data for US industries. A conclusion follows. 
I. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF EXCLUSIVITY 
Exclusivity arrangements are dealt with under section 1 
of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations, 
or conspiracies in restraint of trade.28 Additionally, the 
Clayton Act,29 enacted in 1914, contains an explicit provision 
prohibiting a seller from conditioning sales, prices, discounts 
or rebates 
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or 
purchaser . . . shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, 
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a 
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of 
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, 
or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.30 
The legal treatment of exclusivity agreements has 
 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1914). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914). 
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undoubtedly changed over the years since the enactment of 
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Specifically, the 
numerous welfare-enhancing explanations advanced over 
the years, which will be surveyed subsequently,31 have 
brought about a gradual increase in the minimum threshold 
for concern. As will be shown, in the earlier years, even 
foreclosure of trivial market shares through exclusivity 
arrangements was thought to be concerning. In recent years, 
even foreclosure of 50% does not trigger immediate 
condemnation. Another change is associated with other 
factors of the analysis. Initially, the analysis focused almost 
solely on the foreclosed market share. Nowadays, courts 
consider additional factors that may impact the effect 
exclusivity arrangements have. For example, if barriers to 
entry are very low, even relatively large exclusivity raises 
less concern. 
However, despite the various changes, the percentage of 
the market foreclosed to competitors remains a key 
determinant of the outcome. It is almost always the starting 
point of the analysis, and is often the end of the analysis as 
well, specifically when the foreclosed market shares are 
extreme. As will be shown, when the market share foreclosed 
by exclusivity agreements is extremely small, the 
agreements will be upheld almost automatically. When the 
market shares foreclosed are extremely large, condemnation 
is all but immediate. 
The legal treatment of exclusivity agreements can be 
roughly divided into three periods—the period between the 
enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and the enactment of 
the Clayton Act (1914), the period between the enactment of 
the Clayton Act in 1914 and 1961, and the period between 
1961 and the present.32 
 
 31. See infra Section II.A. 
 32. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 314–34, identifies four different periods in the 
legal treatment of exclusivity agreements. Jacobson divides the third period 
discussed below into two different periods—1961 to the 1990s, and the 1990s to 
present. I explain below, infra note 76, why I consider these two periods to be 
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A. The First Period: 1890 to 1914 
The first period began in 1890, with the enactment of the 
Sherman Act, and ended in 1914, with the enactment of the 
Clayton Act. Between 1890 and 1914, courts refrained 
almost completely from interfering with exclusivity 
arrangements. With few exceptions, US courts followed the 
example set by English courts and upheld exclusivity 
arrangements as ‘partial restraints of trade.’33 The most 
famous of these cases was the Pullman case,34 in which the 
court refused to strike down an agreement granting the 
Pullman Company the exclusive right to furnish sleeping 
cars for all passenger trains controlled by the Chicago, St. 
Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company for a period of 15 
years.35 The agreement, which was one of a series of 
agreements Pullman had with various railroad companies,36 
ultimately enabled Pullman to sustain its monopoly for 
nearly a half-century.37 Caselaw throughout this period 
neither challenged nor adopted the paradigmatic view that 
larger foreclosure always poses greater competitive danger. 
Courts had little reason to grapple with the economic 
complexities of a practice that was, for all practical purposes, 
per se legal. But this period is important in understanding 
 
one. 
 33. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 314–16. 
 34. Chi., St. Louis & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Pullman S. Car Co., 139 U.S. 
79 (1891). 
 35. Id. at 83–84. 
 36. For some of these agreements, see generally Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco 
Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903); Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S. 279 (1905); 
Ohio ex. rel. Sheets v. Union Depot Co., 73 N.E. 633 (1905). For a list of additional 
state cases, see Jacobson, supra note 15, at 315 nn.15–16. 
 37. Pullman’s arrangements (the length of which was gradually shortened) 
continued to occupy the courts for years later. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The 
New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 588 
(1947); William E. Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term 
Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U. L. REV. 412, 414 n.7, 420–21, 423–24 (1948); 
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” Makes No Sense for 
Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 779 n.1 (2006). 
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the development of antitrust doctrine as it relates to 
exclusivity. Naturally, the lack of any in-depth analysis of 
the economic effects of the practice also meant that there 
were no cases in which a court was forced to grapple with the 
possibility that the intuitive view was incorrect. Absent any 
challenges to the intuitive view according to which the 
competitive harm always increases as the foreclosed market 
share increases, this understanding was entrenched. 
B. The Second Period: 1914 to 1961 
The second period began in 1914, with the enactment of 
the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act was aimed at 
strengthening antitrust enforcement, which was thought to 
be lacking under the Sherman Act.38 Certain practices were 
therefore explicitly prohibited. Among these was exclusivity, 
which, as mentioned, Section 3 of the Clayton Act condemned 
whenever its effect “may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce.”39 
Courts were quick to follow the explicit Congressional 
condemnation of exclusivity.40 Exclusivity agreements were 
soon struck down regardless of the justification offered for 
the practice under the specific market settings. The first case 
in which the Supreme Court found an agreement to violate 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act was the Standard Fashion 
 
 38. For a summary of the legislative history of the Clayton Act, see William 
B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in 
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 933–35 (1952). See also Louis B. Schwartz, Potential 
Impairment of Competition: The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v. 
United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 10 (1949); Tying and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 562. 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914). 
 40. The change in the standard of review was noticed almost immediately. 
See Notes, The Legality of Contracts of Sale Which Prevent the Purchaser-Retailer 
from Handling Goods of the Wholesaler’s Competitors, 30 HARV. L. REV. 72, 73 
(1916); see also Jacobson, supra note 15, at 317–23. 
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case,41 a ruling subsequently condemned extensively in 
academic writings.42 A week later, in United Shoe,43 the 
Court struck down exclusivity clauses it had upheld twice in 
the preceding decade under the Sherman Act.44 In both 
cases, the Court seemed to apply a rule of per se illegality to 
the practice, as it conducted no analysis of the effects of the 
exclusivity commitment on market performance.45 But 
shortly thereafter, in Sinclair,46 the Court clarified that the 
practice was not subject to per se condemnation. Following 
this clarification, lower courts began focusing on the market 
shares of the contracting parties, striking down exclusivity 
clauses that resulted in foreclosure of significant market 
shares, and upholding exclusivity arrangements signed by 
firms with insignificant market shares.47 Once again, the 
intuitive linkage between the foreclosed market share and 
the effect on competition was not questioned in any way. The 
courts subscribed to the same basic logic: the larger the 
foreclosed market share, the greater the competitive danger. 
 
 41. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Hous. Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922). 
The appeal to the Supreme Court was the culmination of lengthy litigation, in 
the course of which lower courts repeatedly found the arrangement to be in 
violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Hous. Co., 254 F. 493, 500 (D. Mass. 1918); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane 
Hous. Co., 251 F. 559 (1st Cir. 1918); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Hous. 
Co., 259 F. 793, 795 (1st Cir. 1919). 
 42. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 11, at 305–07; Frank G. Mathewson & Ralph 
A. Winter, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment, 77 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1057, 1057 (1987). But see Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, 
Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 441–43 
(1965). 
 43. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 465 (1922). 
 44. Cf. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217 (1913) (technically 
considering only the agreement forming United Shoe Machinery, not the 
exclusivity covenant); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 65 
(1918) (which, although decided after the enactment of the Clayton Act, pertained 
to offenses that had been committed prior to its enactment). 
 45. See Jacobson, supra note 15, at 318–19. 
 46. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1923). 
 47. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 319–320 & nn.52–54. 
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Approximately a quarter-century later, the legality of 
exclusivity arrangements was again questioned, due to a 
ruling that applied a per se illegality rule to tie-in 
arrangements.48 As both tie-ins and exclusivity are governed 
by Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the ruling finding tie-ins to 
be per se illegal could have been interpreted to apply to 
exclusivity as well, or at least could have affected the legal 
treatment of exclusivity.49 The Supreme Court was again 
called upon to decide on the rule applicable to exclusivity. In 
the landmark Standard Stations case, the Court reaffirmed 
that exclusivity arrangements, as opposed to tying 
arrangements, were not to be judged under the per se 
illegality rule.50 However, complex economic investigations 
would not be required: exclusivity arrangements foreclosing 
“a substantial share of the line of commerce affected” would 
be condemned under Section 3 of the Clayton Act.51 The term 
“substantial share” was interpreted to mean any share that 
was nontrivial. Even foreclosure of relatively small market 
shares was enough for striking down an agreement.52 
 
 48. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (subsequently 
limited to a certain extent in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35 
(1984)). 
 49. See, e.g., Tying and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 561–62, 561–62 nn.13–
15. 
 50. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 314–
15 (1949). 
 51. Id. at 314; see also United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 
286–87 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (affirming case with same 
issues as Standard Stations); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 
465 (1941). The Court’s reasoning in International Salt suggests the same, 
although the case at bar was one of tie-ins, not of exclusivity. 332 U.S. at 396. For 
a discussion of the analogy between the legal treatment of both practices, see 
Schwartz, supra note 38, at 11–12. 
 52. See, e.g., Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 304–05, 314. See generally Tying 
and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 561–62. Although the quote refers directly to 
tying arrangements, the author clarifies that this account holds relevant to the 
analysis of exclusivity agreements. But later in the article a more nuanced 
approach to exclusivity arrangements is identified. See id. at 563. A different 
interpretation of the cases (as conforming to the notion of “workable competition”) 
can be found in Alfred E. Kahn, The Legal and Economic Appraisal of the “New” 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 313–15, 319–22 (1954). Kahn 
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The “substantial foreclosure” test, or the quantitative 
substantiality test,53 was subsequently adopted as the test to 
be applied for scrutiny under the Sherman Act prohibitions 
as well.54 Blake and Jones, summarizing the case law at the 
time, pointed out: “It might be argued that exclusive dealing 
arrangements have compensating advantages . . . . This is a 
good basis for upholding exclusive dealing arrangements 
when they do not threaten to impede entry . . . .”55 
 
acknowledges, however, that although the decisions can be explained by the 
“workable competition” idea, the actual reasoning of the courts suggests that any 
foreclosure of a “not insubstantial” market share is enough for condemnation. See 
id. at 314–15. 
 53. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 320. 
 54. For examples of cases applying the test to the Sherman Act provisions, 
see Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153–54 (1951) (Sherman Act 
section 2); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (Sherman Act section 
1); Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 at 286–87 (Sherman Act section 1 (but not 
section 2) and Clayton Act section 3 with respect to the relevance of intent); FTC 
v. Motion Pictures Advert. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395, 397–98 (technically discussing 
the Federal Trade Commission Act section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45, but stipulating that 
the contracts were in violation of both the monopolization offenses and the 
restraint of trade provisions of the Sherman Act); Barry Wright Corp v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230, 236 (1st Cir. 1983) (Sherman Act sections 1 
and  2 and Clayton Act section 3); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 
1233 (8th Cir. 1987) (although the court did suggest that the prohibition in 
Clayton Act section 3 is broader). This was a change in the understanding of the 
statutes. They were originally perceived as applying different standards of 
liability, which, as mentioned, were in fact the raison d’etre of the Clayton Act. 
See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459–60 (1922); 
William Noel Keyes, Exclusive Foreign Distributor Agreements—Are They 
Illegal?, 41 CAL. L. REV. 439, 443 (1953). For later cases applying a different 
standard of review, see McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 
332, 339 (4th Cir. 1959) (“All that the plaintiffs have done is to apply the Sherman 
law label to the same facts which they charge constituted a Clayton Act 
transgression.”); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1250 
(3d Cir. 1975) (stipulating that analysis under Clayton Act section 3 is more 
stringent than under the Sherman Act). For a recent account of the possibility of 
different standards under the different applicable sections, see Jacobson & Sher, 
supra note 37, at 779–81. 
 55. Blake & Jones, supra note 42, at 445–46 (emphasis added). Interestingly, 
the authors claim that this is what the court did in Tampa Electric Co. v. 
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), as well. But subsequent writings view 
Tampa Electric as the cornerstone of the full-blown rule of reason analysis, that 
calls for a balance of pro- and anti- competitive effects. Although a similar 
outcome may have been reached under the then-prevailing approach, as market 
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By the end of the second period, in 1961, it was well 
established that exclusivity arrangements foreclosing a 
substantial market share, taken to mean any nontrivial 
market share, were illegal regardless of whether they were 
challenged under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. Only 
exclusivity agreements foreclosing insignificant market 
shares were upheld. Once again, the axiom by which there is 
a positive correlation between the foreclosed market share 
and the competitive danger posed by exclusivity was not in 
any way challenged. 
C. The Third Period: 1961 to Present 
The Tampa Electric ruling, delivered in 1961,56 marks 
the beginning of the third period.57 In Tampa Electric, the 
 
shares in Tampa Electric were indeed not extremely significant, the case 
nonetheless marks the advent of a different approach. 
 56. Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 320. 
 57. Jacobson classifies Tampa Electric as part of the second period, and the 
FTC’s decision in Beltone as the case marking the beginning of the third period. 
Jacobson, supra note 15, at 322–23 (citing In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 
68 (1982)), rejecting the traditional classification according to which Tampa 
Electric marks the beginning of the full-blown rule of reason analysis. See, e.g., 
Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 
107–08 (1983); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 
1984). I prefer the traditional classification to Jacobson’s, because cases following 
Tampa Electric, although undoubtedly placing great weight on the substantiality 
of foreclosure, were generally careful to apply a more comprehensive analysis of 
the effects of exclusivity even before Beltone. See, e.g., Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. Am. 
Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1981); Am. Motor Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 
at 1252; Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979); 
see also cases cited infra note 65 (but note that Barry Wright Corp. was decided 
shortly after Beltone). And cases of insignificant foreclosure were routinely 
upheld. See references in Jacobson, supra note 15, at 323 n.77. In fact, at least 
the shift in the Commission’s view actually preceded Tampa Electric. As early as 
1955 it was observed that “the Commission has adopted a less restrictive 
approach to exclusive dealing arrangements and tie-ins. It vigorously rejects the 
contention that they are illegal per se, and requires the hearing examiner to hear 
evidence offered by the defendant that after the agreement was made, the 
number of competitors and the total volume of their business increased, and that 
defendant’s share of the market decreased. The FTC is thus apparently 
committed to the theory that proof of dominance or substantial volume is not 
sufficient to void the agreement if it is shown that there is no deleterious effect 
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Court emphasized that: 
[t]o determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh 
the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective 
competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, 
the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the 
total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the 
probable immediate and future effects which preemption of that 
share of the market might have on effective competition therein. It 
follows that a mere showing that the contract itself involves a 
substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence.58 
Tampa Electric is a paradigm-changing case. It shifted 
the analysis from a one-dimensional focus on market shares, 
to a comprehensive analysis incorporating an account of 
barriers to entry, competitors’ expected responses, the 
duration of the agreement, and additional factors. However, 
despite this important shift, the Court in Tampa Electric did 
not stipulate that market share was of no importance. Quite 
the contrary: The foreclosed market share is explicitly 
mentioned as a key determinant of the competitive danger 
associated with exclusivity agreements,59 and therefore as a 
factor which must be considered in all cases. And within this 
element, the Court subscribed to the widespread view that 
the greater the foreclosed market share,60 the greater the 
competitive harm. 
 
on competition.” Tying and Exclusivity, supra note 20, at 563. For such decisions, 
see id. at 563 n.23. See also Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the 
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956); United States v. 
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (which—although technically analyzing 
a vertical merger and not an exclusivity arrangement—considered the foreclosing 
effect in a section 1 and section 2 analysis and was later relied on in Tampa 
Electric itself). Even according to Jacobson, Tampa Electric’s reasoning is the 
foundation of the shift in focus during the third period. See Jacobson, supra note 
15, at 323–27. 
 58. 365 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 59. See also id. at 328 (where the foreclosed share of the market is mentioned 
as part of the three-stage test that must be conducted before competitive harm 
can be found). 
 60. In the Court’s wording, the “proportionate volume of commerce involved 
in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area.” Id. at 
329. 
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Tampa Electric did not result in an immediate shift to a 
full-blown rule of reason analysis. Courts’ focus on market 
share was not abandoned. Tampa Electric’s immediate effect 
was to alter lower courts’ perception of what level of 
foreclosure constituted innocuous foreclosure. The 
percentage of foreclosure at which exclusivity agreements 
were condemned was steadily raised, and higher and higher 
levels of foreclosure were tolerated. When Tampa Electric 
was handed down, even foreclosure of 6% of the relevant 
market was considered enough for condemnation,61 and in 
one extreme case foreclosure of 1.6% of the relevant market 
resulted in condemnation.62 Gradually, a 30% to 40% market 
share became the threshold for condemnation,63 and some 
later courts even applied a 45% to 50% threshold.64 
Tampa Electric’s less immediate effect was on the 
hegemony of market shares in the competitive analysis of 
exclusivity agreements. Gradually, the myopic focus on 
market share alone was abandoned. Courts eventually began 
considering additional factors as well.65 In Roland 
 
 61. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293 
(1949) (although concern was also expressed with similar practices by other 
dominant firms). 
 62. The most extensively criticized of the rulings that condemned foreclosure 
of small market shares is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
While the case was technically a case of a vertical merger, not an exclusivity 
agreement, the concern was of foreclosure, and the analysis was “consistent with 
prior precedent.” Blake & Jones, supra note 42, at 454; see generally id. at 453–
56. For an account of the different rulings in different contexts see Kahn, supra 
note 52, at 315–322. 
 63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 435–37; Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 
127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997). For an account of the development, see Jacobson, 
supra note 15, at 323–25, 327–28. For a brief account of the state of the law in 
the early 1990s, when the threshold was between 25% and 40%, see HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 398–99 (1st ed. 1994). 
 64. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001); see also infra note 148. 
 65. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 
1983); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Sulmeyer v. Coca-
Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (1975) (considering, inter alia, the question of de facto 
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Machinery,66 the Seventh Circuit upheld an exclusivity 
arrangement67 because the plaintiff had not offered proof of 
a probable anti-competitive effect.68 In Ryko,69 the Eighth 
Circuit took note of the level of distribution that was 
foreclosed and the duration and scope of the agreements, and 
refused to condemn the arrangement.70 In New York News,71 
a district judge upheld exclusivity agreements which 
undoubtedly covered a significant market share (although 
the precise share was not pinpointed, mainly due to 
plaintiffs’ failure to adequately define the market),72 
because, inter alia, there had been “no showing that 
interbrand competition ha[d] been significantly limited or 
that entrance into the newspaper publishing market ha[d] 
been foreclosed.”73 In Paddock Publications, Judge 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit emphasized that 
competition for exclusives was in itself a form of competition 
 
exclusivity and finding the jury’s conclusion of no exclusionary effect 
sustainable); Joyce Beverages v Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a survey of recent cases and courts’ focus on actual effects, 
see Jacobson & Sher, supra note 37, at 793–98. In some cases, indicia other than 
market share were considered as a substitute for market share, especially when 
market share had not been proven. But in several cases, additional factors were 
considered alongside market share. 
 66. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 67. I use the term “arrangement” and not “agreement” intentionally, because 
the court grappled with the question of whether an actual agreement existed. But 
the court’s conclusion is not based on the distinction. Id. at 393 (“Actually, it is 
not important whether Dresser’s antipathy to nonexclusive dealing was secret.”). 
 68. A demonstration of such a probability requires proof of two issues: One is 
that at least one significant competitor is likely to be kept out of the market due 
to the exclusives. The other is that the result of this exclusion is likely to be a 
raise in prices above the competitive level. Id. at 394. 
 69. Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 70. See id. at 1234–35. 
 71. See Bowen v. N.Y. News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 72. See id. at 678. 
 73. Id. at 679. This was only one reason for rejecting the argument. The main 
argument for rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention was that they lacked standing to 
sue. See id. at 677–78. As previously noted, the court also pointed out that the 
plaintiffs had failed to adequately define the market. See id. at 678. 
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to be protected by antitrust laws,74 even though the end 
result—a large market share unavailable to competitors due 
to a series of exclusivity agreements—may seem like a 
foreclosed market. 
In Omega,75 a case in the Ninth Circuit, a dominant 
producer, Gilbarco, refused to deal with Omega, a distributor 
who would not deal exclusively with Gilbarco. Gilbarco was 
the market leader, with a 55% market share, and its policy 
of refusing to deal with distributors who were not exclusive 
to its brand foreclosed 38% of the market. The circuit court 
emphasized the availability of alternative distribution 
channels, the short duration of the exclusivity contract, and 
the ease with which the exclusivity contract could be 
terminated. It consequently refused to strike down the 
agreement. 
At least since Omega: 
[C]ourts, for the most part, have demanded rigorous proof of the 
relevant market in which market power is assessed; have required 
plaintiffs to distinguish exclusive dealing contracts won through 
aggressive competition from those that are profitable only because 
of their negative effect on rivals; and have given extended 
consideration to proffered efficiency justifications. The focus on true 
market power in these cases is not attributable to a concern that 
market power in the abstract, unrelated to the challenged conduct, 
is harmful (although that is often true). The concern is instead that 
creating or increasing market power through exclusive dealing is 
the means by which the defendant is likely to increase prices, 
restrict output, reduce quality, slow innovation, or otherwise harm 
consumers.76 
 
 74. See Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Trib. Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996). 
However, competition for exclusives may also be anti-competitive, as 
demonstrated by the Canadian Nielsen case. See Dir. of Investigation & Rsch. v. 
D&B Cos. of Can. Ltd. (Nielsen) [1995] C.C.T.D. No. 20, 64 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (Can. 
Ont. C.C.T.D.); see also Michal S. Gal, The Nielsen Case: Was Competition 
Restored? On the Anti-Competitive Effects of a Partial Enforcement of Competition 
Laws, 29 CAN. BUS. L.J. 17, 18 (1998). 
 75. See Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 76. Jacobson, supra note 15, at 328. Jacobson considers Omega to be the 
inception of a fourth period, in which courts are firmly committed to a full-blown 
rule of reason analysis. Id. I do not challenge Jacobson’s point, but as the 
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The most famous exclusivity case in recent years is the 
Microsoft case,77 in which the Second Circuit engaged in an 
elaborate analysis of the effect that a series of arrangements 
between Microsoft and independent entities had on 
Netscape’s ability to compete effectively in the Internet 
Browser market. Emphasis was placed not only on the share 
of the foreclosed distribution outlets, but also on the relative 
efficacy of these outlets. The circuit court was willing to 
condemn exclusivity arrangements even when the 40% to 
50% foreclosure threshold usually required was not met.78 
Other cases also demonstrate an emphasis on the real effect 
of the arrangements on market structure and performance.79 
But despite the shift to a full-blown rule of reason 
analysis, market share remains the key element of the 
analysis. As the district court in Visa pointed out, “[E]ven 
after Tampa Elec., the degree to which an agreement 
forecloses the market remains arguably the most important 
 
preceding survey shows, the courts’ commitment to a rule of reason analysis can 
be found in quite a few rulings that preceded Omega (although the rule of reason 
was less developed in the early days of this period). As Judge Posner wrote in 
1984 in Roland Machinery: “Although the Supreme Court has not decided an 
exclusive-dealing case in many years, it now appears most unlikely that such 
agreements, whether challenged under section 3 of the Clayton Act or section 1 
of the Sherman Act, will be judged by the simple and strict test of Standard 
Stations. They will be judged under the Rule of Reason, and thus condemned only 
if found to restrain trade unreasonably.” Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 
749 F.2d 380, 393 (7th Cir. 1984). Omega is thus, for current purposes, one point 
in the long period beginning in Tampa Electric, which resulted in a gradual shift 
from a technical focus on the substantiality of foreclosure to a full-blown rule of 
reason. 
 77. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 78. See id. at 35, 46, 52–53. 
 79. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Acco Brands, Inc., No. CV99–
1877DT(MCX), 2000 WL 986995, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000) (discussing 
barriers to entry, even though the defendant had a 75% market share, and 
concluding that there was a likelihood of consumer harm); Louisa Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815–16 (E.D. 
Ky. 1999) (concluding that the harm to the competitor was the result of hard 
competition, not of harm to competition itself); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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factor in determining whether the agreement violates § 1.”80 
Within the framework of the market share analysis, the idea 
that the competitive harm is always positively correlated to 
the foreclosed market share at all levels of foreclosure is still 
prevalent. 
One immediate effect of this paradigm is that despite the 
courts’ rhetoric, exclusivity arrangements foreclosing large 
market shares are practically never upheld.81 However, the 
number of exclusivity agreements actually struck down by 
courts greatly understates the effect of this paradigm. The 
prevailing paradigm has a much greater effect than a simple 
review of the case law may suggest. An extremely important 
effect of the rule is its effect on those agreements that are not 
reached for fear of condemnation. This is an unobservable 
effect because by definition it can only be measured by the 
number of agreements that are not struck due to the 
applicable rule (or that are concealed for fear of 
condemnation). However, there is good reason to think that 
this effect is significant. First, it can generally be assumed 
that business entities, through their officers and legal 
advisors, are well aware of the prevailing view on exclusivity 
arrangements and of the state of the law.82 Second, this is 
even more likely given that, in this respect, the application 
 
 80. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Visa U.S.A., No. 04 
Civ.8967(BSJ), 2005 WL 1515399, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005). 
 81. This does not change whether the analysis is conducted within the 
framework of the Clayton Act section 3, or the Sherman Act section 1 and section 
2. Although the Clayton Act section 3 was originally intended to apply a stricter 
standard than the Sherman Act, analysis under the Acts eventually converged. 
See cases cited supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 82. The idea that through legal advice economic actors conduct themselves 
with the correct legal outcome in mind is not novel in any way. In fact, even in 
settings in which we do not expect laypersons to be versed in any way, such as 
litigation, the assumption is normally that decisions are informed by the expected 
application of the legal rule. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: 
A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal 
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). In the specific context of antitrust law, see 
CrimA 7829/03 State of Israel v. Ariel Elec. Eng’g Traffic Lights & Control Ltd., 
60(2) PD 120 (2005) (Isr.). 
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of the law has not changed for over a full century, at least 
since the enactment of the Clayton Act. A business entity 
considering signing exclusivity arrangements resulting in 
foreclosure of large market shares would be cautioned by any 
attorney it consulted that its exclusivity clauses would likely 
be unenforceable. 
Thus, if the paradigm is erroneous—which, as 
subsequently explained, it is—its effect on competition is 
difficult to measure, but nonetheless crystal clear. An 
infinite number of arrangements foreclosing extreme market 
shares are simply not struck for fear of condemnation. 
Disallowing perfectly benign exclusivity arrangements is 
itself a social cost. It is socially undesirable to steer parties 
away from their preferred (harmless) business arrangement, 
and force them to settle for the second best alternative, or to 
conceal the contracts (and risk sanctions). This is certainly 
the case when it is clear that exclusivity arrangements can 
achieve a host of welfare-enhancing goals, as will be 
subsequently shown. 
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the 
prohibition on exclusivity encompasses not just exclusivity 
that takes the form of an explicit contractual commitment 
not to deal with competitors. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 
and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act all apply to 
agreements that include some kind of financial inducement 
to exclusivity, even if dealing with competitors is not 
nominally prohibited.83 Thus, for example, loyalty discounts 
and rebate systems that induce de facto exclusivity are also 
under the purview of the antitrust prohibitions.84 Similarly, 
an agreement for the employment of technological measures 
that will make a competitor’s product less accessible may 
 
 83. With respect to section 3 of the Clayton Act, this is explicit in the language 
of the Act itself. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version 
at 15 U.S.C. § 14). 
 84. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Lockhart 
& Sacks, supra note 38, at 919–20. 
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also be prohibited by antitrust laws.85 Each of these may be 
done for pro-competitive reasons. For example, the 
employment of technological measures may serve to protect 
sensitive systems from being compromised.86 But business 
entities know that if a side effect of such a system—whether 
or not intended—is to foreclose a significant portion of the 
market to competitors, it will not be upheld. They thus have 
good reason to refrain from introducing such technologies. If 
firms are steered away from what is otherwise their 
preferred course of action, the condemnation of large 
foreclosure has additional grave effects which are not 
captured by a mere survey of the case law. 
Against this backdrop, it is helpful to review the host of 
welfare-enhancing goals that exclusivity may achieve, so as 
to understand the scope of what antitrust law may be 
wrongfully preventing. Subsequently, the anti-
competitiveness of exclusivity will be analyzed in detail, in 
order to understand why anti-competitive foreclosure of 
extremely large market shares is unlikely, and at times 
impossible even on a completely theoretical level. 
II. THE WELFARE-ENHANCING AND WELFARE-REDUCING 
EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVITY 
Against the backdrop of the current state of the law that 
generally condemns exclusivity agreements whenever they 
foreclose a very large market share to competitors, it is 
helpful to review the welfare-enhancing and welfare-
reducing effects of exclusivity. Subsequently, the 
prerequisites for anti-competitive exclusivity will be 
scrutinized in greater detail to show why the intuitive link 
between large foreclosure and harm to competition must be 
severed. 
 
 85. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 86. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Agreements and the Leverage Problem, 
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (in the specific context of tying arrangements) . 
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A. Welfare-Enhancing Effects 
Exclusivity agreements may achieve a host of welfare-
enhancing goals.87 
First, exclusivity reduces the parties’ uncertainty. 
Specifically, parties can use these agreements to insulate 
themselves from fluctuations in price and quantity. This may 
be extremely important if there are sunk costs that are 
specific to the relationship. There are a host of circumstances 
in which a party to an agreement must make significant 
relationship-specific investments. Examples may be 
adapting a plant to produce a product that is compatible with 
the purchaser’s needs, purchasing packing and labeling 
machinery that conforms to the purchaser’s requirements, 
and so on. If the party required to make these relationship-
specific investments is not guaranteed a certain amount of 
sales for a predetermined price, the investments may be 
abandoned. Exclusivity arrangements shielding the 
investing party from fluctuations in price may thus be 
essential to facilitate the investment in the first place.88 The 
 
 87. See generally Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 
57 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 88. See, e.g., Stockhausen, supra note 3737, at 413–15; Blake & Jones, supra 
note 4242, at 440 (discussing full vertical integration, where this advantage is 
more pronounced); Schwartz, supra note 38, at 12 (focusing on a variation of this 
explanation: “a constant supply of goods at a definite price without the financial 
burden of a large inventory”); Mark Q Connelly, Exclusive Dealing and Tied 
Selling under the Amended Combines Investigation Act, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
521, 528 (1976) (offering a very close variation of the argument: “[due to a] 
continuous supply even in times of shortage . . . dealers are relieved of the need 
to carry large inventories”). An element of this explanation that is sometimes 
overlooked is the ostensible inadequacy of exclusivity alone to achieve stability. 
In fact, exclusivity may seem counter-productive in this scenario. If the 
purchasers’ total demand falls for some reason, the seller will not have sold the 
minimum number of units it needs to sell. On the other hand, if demand 
increases, the seller will need to increase production so as to meet the increased 
demand, perhaps to a point at which production is unprofitable. See generally 
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
35–44 (4th ed. 2005). At times, the seller may even be unable to supply all of the 
buyers’ demand. Ostensibly, therefore, exclusivity is a cumbersome way of 
reducing volatility. A long-term contract stipulating price and quantity for the 
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Tampa Electric case previously mentioned89 demonstrates 
this neatly. In Tampa Electric, a public utility decided to try 
to use coal instead of oil as boiler fuel in two generating units 
of a new plant. Naturally, this required significant 
adaptations of the production process. As per the Court, 
Tampa Electric, the public utility, expended nearly USD $30 
million (in 2020 terms) in excess of what it would have 
expended on oil-burning units.90 Similarly, Tampa’s 
contractual counterpart, Nashville Coal, expended 
approximately USD $70 million (in 2020 terms) in preparing 
to perform the contract. Any change in the price of coal would 
have had a dramatic impact on both parties’ cost-benefit 
analysis, making profitability extremely volatile. The 
exclusivity arrangement, in which Tampa Electric 
committed to purchase all its coal-requirements for a period 
of twenty years, assured both parties that their investment 
would not be in vein. The exclusivity commitment was 
apparently essential to facilitate deal-specific investments 
 
duration of the contract is both straightforward and more effective in reducing 
volatility. See also PHILIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, 
AND CASES 654–55 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing that the problem of fluctuations in 
buyers’ demand is implicitly dealt with, when the authors describe the setting as 
one in which users have “fairly stable requirements”; the problem explicitly 
addressed by the authors is closely related to the one described here); Victor P. 
Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term 
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987); 
Stockhausen, supra note 37, at 412 (“[T]he amount remains indefinite and in fact 
may be zero.”). However, in real-life settings, exclusivity may be a workable proxy 
for specified quantities, although the seller may prefer a firm commitment to 
specified prices and quantities, and although such agreements are sometimes 
struck. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 
1983); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979). 
Buyers may be reluctant to make such a commitment because they themselves 
do not know, at the time the contract is struck, the precise quantities they will 
need. Thus, they may be more inclined to commit to purchasing all of their 
demand from the seller than to commit to purchasing a fixed number of units, 
especially when the contract is of greater length. On the seller’s side, although 
this guarantee may be less appealing than a firm commitment, it is nonetheless 
of value, specifically if buyers’ demand is relatively stable. See AREEDA ET AL., 
supra note 88, at 654; Stockhausen, supra note 37, at 414. 
 89. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
 90. See id. at 323. 
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totaling nearly USD $100,000,000 (in 2020 terms).91 
A second, closely-related, advantage of exclusivity is that 
it prevents the “hold up” problem.92 Even ignoring volatility, 
and even assuming that investments are initially justified 
even absent exclusivity, once a party has made deal-specific 
commitments, its contractual counterpart may try to take 
advantage of these deal-specific investments to extract a 
better deal than negotiated. Knowing this ex ante, the party 
that is supposed to make the investment will refrain from 
making it. Exclusivity is an “efficient contractual guarantee 
against the hold-up problem,”93 without which “the product 
might not be developed at all, and, at the very least, 
investment in product-specific assets . . . would be 
reduced.”94 
Exclusivity also eliminates free riding, which may occur 
when a manufacturer’s competitors can enjoy the benefits of 
the manufacturer’s investments,95 be they investments in 
the brand and the like, or the funding of retail-level 
services.96 If a manufacturer invests in increasing demand 
for its own brand, for example through advertising, 
consumers will be attracted to retailers who carry the brand 
by virtue of the manufacturer’s investment. If these retailers 
 
 91. See also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY 540 (2002). 
 92. See RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 665–66 (8th ed. 
2015). 
 93. TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 91, at 628. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 461; WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 92, at 665 (“A free-rider problem 
can arise where a supplier invests in promotion at a retailer’s premises which a 
competing supplier takes advantage of: a non-compete provision may be justified 
to prevent this type of free-riding.”). 
 96. For examples of different ways in which the manufacturer may incur the 
costs of these services, see Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v Chrysler Corp., 570 
F.2d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 US 913 (1978); Coleman Motor 
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1341–42 (3d Cir. 1975); Mount Lebanon 
Motors v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1968); see also Russell 
Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1, 52 (1982) (Comm’r Miller, dissenting). 
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also carry competing brands that are sold for a lower price 
(as they do not need to cover the costs of advertisement), 
consumers may ultimately purchase these competing brands 
rather than the brand that they were originally searching 
for. A retailer may intentionally use the advertised brand to 
lure consumers and offer them a competing brand for a lower 
price.97 This may also simply be a result of the availability of 
the less-expensive brand. Regardless of the retailer’s 
motivation, this essentially allows competing manufacturers 
to free ride on the manufacturer’s investment. Similarly, a 
manufacturer may be willing to fund retail-level services, for 
example by offering training for sale personnel.98 But if 
competing manufacturers free ride on these services, 
manufacturers will be unwilling to fund or provide them.99 
Free riding on services is a real issue. According to a recent 
inquiry conducted by the European Commission, nearly half 
of all manufacturers and retailers believe free-riding to be 
 
 97. Note that this is different from ‘bait and switch selling’ prohibited under 
Section 74.04 of the Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34. 
 98. A closely related question is why retailers—who accrue the additional 
profits from the sale of all brands—will not spontaneously provide the services, 
obviating the need for remuneration in the first place. But retailers’ profit-
margin, or their return on the investment, may be different from the 
manufacturer’s, thus making the investment unprofitable from their perspective. 
Additionally, retailers face an analogous free-riding problem, known as the intra-
brand free riding problem. The intra-brand free rider problem may be overcome 
with the reverse exclusivity provision, namely exclusive supply, whereby the 
manufacturer commits to selling exclusively to a single (service providing) 
retailer. Intra-brand free riding can also be overcome by assigning exclusive 
territories to retailers or—according to traditional antitrust analysis—by 
imposing a price minimum on retailers. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The 
Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 
(1955); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance—A Monopoly Problem, 
25 J. BUS. U. CHI. 141, 151 (1952); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers 
Want Fair Trade, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. 
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). On the incentive alignment when profit 
margins are different, see Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics 
of Slotting Contracts, 50 J.L. & ECON 421 (2007). 
 99. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Final report on the E-
commerce Sector Inquiry, para. 46 n.51, COM (2017) 229 final (May 10, 2017). 
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common or very common.100 Manufacturers can eliminate 
this problem by demanding that retailers who receive these 
services remain exclusive to them.101 Exclusivity can thus 
facilitate investment in product distribution.102 
A fourth welfare-enhancing function exclusivity may 
accomplish is the inducement of retail-level selling efforts.103 
Exclusivity agreements link the fates of retailers to that of 
manufacturers. If a retailer carries several brands, it is 
relatively indifferent to the success of any specific brand. By 
contrast, if a retailer’s success is contingent on the success of 
the specific brand, as it is when the retailer carries that 
brand exclusively, the retailer is motivated to promote the 
 
 100. Id. paras. 312–323. 
 101. Id. para. 48. For real-life examples, see Case T–88/92, Groupement 
d’Achat Édouard Leclerc v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-196, ¶¶ 94–96, and Case T–
87/92, BVBA Kruidvat v. Comm’n, 1996 ECR II-1931, ¶ 45 (both cases raise this 
argument with regards to selective distribution contracts of cosmetics); Pictorial 
Rev. Co. v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 255 F. 206, 206–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (describing the 
defendant’s investment in the distribution system); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
Int’l Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1967) (enumerating the benefits the 
plaintiff got from carrying the brand); see also Steuer, supra note 57, at 114–16. 
 102. Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982); Ryko Mfg. 
Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987); Dennis Waelbroeck, Vertical 
Agreements: 4 Years of Liberalisation by Regulation n. 2790/99 After 40 Years of 
Legal (Block) Regulation, in THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 85, 
100–01 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 2006); Stanley I. Ornstein, Exclusive Dealing and 
Antitrust, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 65, 69–70, 74–76 (1989); Notice of the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority on the “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints,” 2012 O.J. (C 
362) 1, paras. 106–08 [hereinafter EFTA]. 
 103. See A. Douglas Melamed, Thoughts About Exclusive Dealing, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL: 2007, at 433, 434 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
& Mel Marquis eds., 2008); Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition 
For Distribution “On The Merits”, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 137–60 (2003); 
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition 
for Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433 (2008); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 38, 
at 921–22; Keyes, supra note 54, at 441. A prominent real-life example of this use 
of exclusivity can be found in Joyce Beverages v. Royal Crown Cola. 555 F. Supp. 
271, 273–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);see also BORK, supra note 11, at 306–307; AREEDA ET 
AL., supra note 88, at 655 (pointing to some concern with the possible divergence 
between the manufacturer’s interest and the social interest, but pointing to two 
cases in which the pro-competitive benefits of exclusivity seem the strongest). 
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brand and ensure its success.104 Theoretically, these services 
may be contracted for, but perfect contracts are extremely 
difficult to write, and enforcement is always costly, 
specifically when the contract seeks to ensure unquantifiable 
elements, such as zeal, politeness, etc. Exclusivity ties the 
retailer’s fate to that of the manufacturer’s, thereby 
guaranteeing that the retailer will be incentivized to perform 
retail-level services to the best of its ability. Exclusivity may 
thus function as an enforcement mechanism that aligns the 
parties’ respective interests in a manner that is less costly 
than a contract that does the same, even if a contract is a 
feasible option.105 
A fifth advantage of exclusivity arrangements is that 
they may help manufacturers verify that products have 
originated with them. This may be especially important 
when manufacturers assume post-sale duties vis-à-vis end 
consumers, such as warranties, maintenance, or service. Of 
course, other mechanisms such as barcodes and the like may 
be useful in verifying the origin of the product, but 
exclusivity may function as one such mechanism. Any 
product purchased from the specific retailer is guaranteed to 
have originated from the manufacturer. Closely related, 
exclusivity may also serve to ensure consumers of the origin 
of the product. If the manufacturer’s brand commands a 
premium over other brands, consumers may require 
assurances that they are receiving the manufacturer’s brand 
in return for their additional expenditure. Exclusivity may 
be a way to ensure consumers that the product they are 
purchasing originates from the manufacturer.106 
 
 104. This commitment is of value even if the manufacturer is not concerned 
with inter-brand free riding. See Joyce Beverages, 555 F. Supp. at 273–76; 
Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 841, 847 (5th Cir. 1975); Steuer, supra 
note 57, at 124–26; Marvel, supra note 102, at 2, 4–5 (arguing that this is not a 
viable explanation for exclusivity). 
 105. For a similar analysis of resale price maintenance, see Benjamin Klein & 
Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 
J.L. & ECON 265 (1988). 
 106. Steuer, supra note 57, at 131–32; Ornstein, supra note 102, at 75–76; 
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Finally, exclusivity can reduce parties’ transaction costs. 
While on-the-spot sales require ongoing negotiations, parties 
to exclusivity agreements need not renegotiate 
continuously.107 Even if market prices remain unchanged for 
the contract’s duration, eliminating volatility and reducing 
the number of transactions—and, by extension, transaction 
costs—will reduce the parties’ total expenditures.108 
 
Connelly, supra note 88, at 527. For a variation of this claim, focusing on the 
quality of the product, see EFTA, supra note 102, at para. 107(c); see also 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977); Steuer, 
supra note 57, at 131–32. Note, however, that Steuer cites Susser v. Carvel Corp., 
id. at 132 (citing Susser v. Carvel Corp., 323 F.2d 505, 516 (2d Cir. 1964)), and 
thus seems to focus more on the way the dealer handles the product (the quality 
and functioning of which the manufacturer has guaranteed) than on the 
identification of its origin. There are, of course, additional ways in which the 
manufacturer can verify the origin of a product, the most obvious of which is by 
applying a trademark or logo to the product. However, trademark law is aimed 
at preventing consumers’, not producers’, confusion as to origin. See ROBERT M. 
MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 529–34, 621–25 (6th ed. 2012); see also AMF, Inc. v. 
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). Origin-verifiability for the 
producer is merely a beneficial byproduct of the prevention of consumer 
confusion, which (along with the more recently recognized goal of dilution-
prevention) is the aim of trademark law. Therefore, trademark law may not 
adequately address the manufacturer’s concern (for example, if consumers are 
entirely indifferent as to the origin of the product or if the brand had become 
generic). See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
 107. BORK, supra note 11, at 309; Stockhausen, supra note 37, at 414; Ornstein, 
supra note 102, at 77. Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin question the need for 
exclusivity to achieve this goal. They point to the fact that a simple pattern of 
regular repeated purchases from the seller would tend to produce the same 
savings. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 88, at 655. But exclusivity does more than to 
simply produce these savings. It assures parties, ex ante, that renegotiation will 
not be required. Repeated transactions may have this ex post effect, but they do 
not offer parties ex ante confidence that this will be the case. 
 108. At the same time, when a contract is struck for a longer period of time, 
the number of contingencies that must be resolved is greater, as is the level of 
uncertainty. See Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts, 
Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 121 (1993) 
(describing concerns that arise from supply assurances). Similarly, future 
disagreements on addressing contingencies that arise, which the parties did not 
fully consider or specify at the time of signing, can be expected to be higher in 
long-term contracts. The cost-savings associated with long-term contracts are 
thus more accurately defined as the difference between the savings attributed to 
the smaller number of negotiations and the added cost of dealing (both ex ante 
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Importantly for current purposes, each one of 
exclusivity’s numerous advantages may be relevant both 
when exclusivity is widespread, thereby foreclosing large 
market shares, and when it is not. Exclusivity arrangements 
covering 100% of the market are not less likely to achieve any 
of the welfare-enhancing goals than exclusivity 
arrangements covering 80% of the market. For example, if 
retailers are expected to perform services that cannot be 
contracted for, and exclusivity achieves this by tying their 
fate to the manufacturer’s fate, a manufacturer can be 
expected to attempt to sign such agreements with all 
retailers. If the objection to widespread exclusivity is to be 
justified, the justification can come only from a linkage 
between foreclosure of large market shares and exclusivity’s 
anti-competitive potential. The balancing act of weighing 
pro- and anti- competitive effects may yield different results 
only due to the increased anti-competitive potential of 
widespread exclusivity. It cannot hinge on a difference in the 
pro-competitive effects. It is, therefore, necessary to carefully 
scrutinize exclusivity’s potential for anti-competitive effects. 
B. Anti-Competitive Effects 
Notwithstanding its welfare-enhancing functions, 
exclusivity may also be used anti-competitively. This use is 
probably the most intuitive use of exclusivity. Exclusivity 
contracts may exclude a competitor or competitors, thus 
enhancing or entrenching a firm’s market power.109 For ease 
 
and ex post) with additional and less certain contingencies. 
 109. A variation of this explanation is offered in David Gilo, Retail Competition 
Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of Vertical Integration, Tying, and 
Vertical Restraints to Stop it, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (2003). According to the 
hypothesis developed there, exclusivity may be one means through which an 
upstream firm with market power overcomes what is referred to as the 
“commitment paradox.” Essentially, through exclusivity the firm is able to assure 
its downstream buyer that it will not offer a hidden concession to the buyer’s 
competitor. See id. at 54–57. However, in contrast to traditional analysis, the 
motivation for the exclusivity arrangement is not to enhance the downstream 
buyer’s market power, but rather to allow the upstream firm—the firm granting 
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of exposition, we may again think of exclusive purchasing 
arrangements, whereby retailers commit to purchase 
exclusively from a manufacturer. By signing exclusivity 
agreements with retailers, the upstream firm denies its 
competitors access to distribution outlets. These competitors 
must consequently either distribute their product through 
existing outlets that have not committed to exclusive 
purchasing, or induce independent entry into distribution. If 
the foreclosed outlets are the more efficient outlets—the ones 
at the more desirable locations, and so on—the firm granted 
exclusivity gains an inherent advantage over its competitors. 
The cost disadvantage of these competitors allows the 
upstream firm that signed the exclusivity agreements to 
profitably elevate prices.110 
Although ostensibly straightforward, the anti-
competitive potential of exclusivity is, in fact, more complex 
than it seems. Early writings of members of the Chicago 
School argued that exclusivity is unlikely to ever be used to 
forestall competition. The driving force behind this argument 
is that anti-competitive exclusivity is detrimental to the 
interests of the party granting exclusivity. First, consider the 
 
exclusivity—to exploit its market power and charge supra-competitive wholesale 
prices. I do not discuss this function separately because despite the different 
motivation, the end result is similar for purposes of the present analysis. As 
mentioned previously, there are also other anti-competitive explanations, but 
these are more debatable and are contingent on relatively limiting market 
characteristics. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 110. The analysis of a cost disadvantage as a prerequisite to, and in fact the 
essence of, anti-competitive exclusivity arrangements follows Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986), which has since 
become the mainstream view of the competitive concern raised by exclusivity 
arrangements. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and 
Other Exclusionary Conduct: Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 
375 (2006). For a view according to which the focus should be shifted, see Steven 
C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006). For earlier analyses of the anti-
competitive potential, focusing on the exclusion of competitors, see Director & 
Levi, supra note 57, at 290; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 38, at 923–31. See 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 251 (2d ed. 2001). 
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setting of a seller who sells to an end consumer. Posner111 
and Bork112 make the point that in this setting an agreement 
to exclude competition is highly unlikely. Buyers are 
adversely affected by the preservation (or establishment) of 
a monopoly. Once the monopoly has been established, these 
buyers will be charged higher prices than they would have 
been charged had competition prevailed. Knowing this, they 
will be reluctant to participate in a scheme to preserve or 
establish a monopoly at the seller’s level unless they are 
compensated in full for their prospective losses. At the very 
least, they will demand to receive the full value of the 
monopoly overcharge (which they will ultimately pay) before 
they sign exclusivity agreements with the to-be monopolist. 
This, in turn, implies that the seller’s prospective gains from 
the preservation of the monopoly will all be dissipated in the 
form of payments to customers, making the scheme 
unprofitable for the seller. Anti-competitive exclusivity—
exclusivity enhancing or entrenching one party’s market 
power—cannot be mutually beneficial from the contracting 
parties’ perspective. There is thus a natural check on this use 
of exclusivity as an anti-competitive device. 
This does not, of course, imply that exclusivity is never 
mutually beneficial. It will be beneficial if it achieves one or 
more of the welfare-enhancing goals previously discussed. In 
such settings it has the potential to increase overall—and 
consequently both parties’—welfare. But anti-competitive 
exclusivity of the kind discussed by Chicago School theorists 
cannot achieve this. Anti-competitive exclusivity enhancing 
one party’s market power is a zero-sum game, in which any 
gain to one of the parties comes at the expense of its 
contractual counterpart. 
Posner concluded that, although it is not impossible that 
out of ignorance or irrationality a firm will engage in 
exclusionary practices, “it is unlikely that a rational profit 
 
 111. POSNER, supra note 11, at 203–05. 
 112. BORK, supra note 11. 
1130 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
maximizing firm will use exclusive dealing as a method of 
excluding a competitor.”113 And Bork argued that “[t]he truth 
appears to be that there has never been a case in which 
exclusive dealing or requirements contracts were shown to 
injure competition . . . . [T]here is every reason to believe 
that exclusive dealing and requirements contracts have no 
purpose or effect other than the creation of efficiency.”114 
The analysis does not change if the setting is one of a 
manufacturer and retailers instead of a seller and end 
consumers. Here too, there is no scope for acquiring 
additional market power through exclusivity arrangements 
in a manner that benefits both parties. It may seem that, 
because retailers can join forces with a manufacturer to 
elevate prices to end consumers, there is scope for anti-
competitive exclusivity. This, however, is not the case. 
Exclusivity does not, in and of itself, change demand for the 
product in any way. Therefore, to the extent that it does not 
achieve one or more of the pro-competitive goals surveyed 
earlier, it does not allow prices to be elevated profitably 
beyond their but-for-exclusivity levels. These may be high or 
low, depending on the (pre-existing) market power of the 
manufacturer and the retailers. But exclusivity in and of 
itself will do nothing to change the optimal price that 
consumers can be charged for the product. Any increase in 
prices following an (anti-competitive) exclusivity 
arrangement of the kind discussed by Chicago School 
scholars will inevitably decrease the total (joint) profits of 
retailers and the manufacturer, because the effect of lost 
sales (end consumers who discontinue purchases due to 
higher prices) will necessarily outweigh any gains from 
higher prices. Otherwise, retail prices would have already 
been set higher before the introduction of exclusivity. 
Consequently, post- and pre- exclusivity prices cannot be 
 
 113. POSNER, supra note 11, at 205. 
 114. BORK, supra note 11, at 309. 
2021] ANTITRUST LAW’S HARM 1131 
different.115 
Therefore, if exclusivity confers upon the manufacturer 
market power that the manufacturer would not have 
otherwise possessed, resulting in elevated prices and 
reduced quantities, this will come at the expense of retailers, 
whose total profits will have declined. Much like the 
relationship between a seller and buyers who are end 
consumers, the relationship between a manufacturer and 
retailers is a zero-sum game in terms of profit. There is a 
single price at which (joint) profits from sales are maximized. 
The price-quantity trade-off is maximized at a specific point 
on the demand curve. This does not change simply because 
the parties have agreed to exclusivity. Any additional dollar 
accruing to the manufacturer is a dollar out of retailers’ 
pockets, and vice versa.116 Consequently, the analysis of the 
manufacturer-retailer setting is similar to that of the seller-
end consumer setting.117 A mutually beneficial anti-
 
 115. For an early analysis of the phenomenon suggesting that this may be the 
case, see Kahn, supra note 5252, at 317; Stockhausen, supra note 3737, at 428–
29. See also cases cited supra note 25. 
 116. This analysis is attributable to the well-known double marginalization 
problem, originally identified developed in the late 1950s and essentially 
unchallenged since. If retailers possess market power, whether due to an 
oligopolistic market structure or due to a cartel-like agreement, they have 
nothing to gain from allowing a monopoly at the manufacturer’s level, for reasons 
similar to those discussed with respect to the manufacturer’s incentives. See 
Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
347, 352 (1950). If transaction costs are not prohibitive, the two successive 
monopolies can be expected to negotiate a division of the monopoly rents between 
them, and continue to charge the optimal monopoly price. See ROGER D. BLAIR & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 109–25 
(1993). If negotiations over the share of the rents granted to each of the economic 
agents are prohibitively costly, or otherwise fail, the problem may result in no 
production at all as in the “tragedy of the anti-commons.” See Michael A. Heller, 
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (describing the tragedy of the anti-
commons). The tragedy of the anti-commons is in fact an extreme case of the 
double marginalization problem. 
 117. Although not identical in all respects. A formal model illustrating the 
difference is developed in Ittai Paldor, RPM as an Exclusionary Practice, 55 
ANTITRUST BULL. 309 (2010). 
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competitive arrangement of the kind discussed by Posner 
and Bork is impossible. 
Another important note is that this analysis is 
insensitive to the degree of pre-contractual market power 
each party possesses. It does not change if the manufacturer 
being granted exclusivity has some market power, 
significant market power, or even if it is a perfect monopoly. 
Similarly, it does not change if retailers’ market power is 
significant or insignificant.118 Ultimately, there is a single 
optimal price and a single corresponding quantity, both 
unaffected by (anti-competitive) exclusivity. An economic 
agent allowing a seller or a buyer to artificially enhance its 
market power, is in essence transferring some of its share of 
the supra-competitive rents to its contractual counterpart.119 
Whether it continues to make the same per-unit profit but 
loses sales due to elevated prices, or continues to make the 
same number of sales for a smaller per-unit profit, it has lost 
from the enhancement of a seller’s or buyer’s market 
power.120 
 
 118. In reality, all economic agents possess some market power. No economic 
agent faces a perfectly elastic demand curve. This is known as “monopolostic 
competition,” a concept originally developed by Chamberlin. See EDWARD 
HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 
1962). 
 119. For a clear articulation of the importance of this phenomenon in the 
context of rebates, which for current purposes is similar to the context of 
exclusivity, see Timothy J. Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather than 
Predation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 335, 367–68 (2008). 
 120. Although similar, this argument is different from the argument that a 
manufacturer cannot profit from monopolizing an additional link in the chain of 
production. Over the years, several challenges to the so-called “single monopoly 
profit theory” have been launched. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, 
and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009) 
(summarizing the challenges to the single profit monopoly theory). These 
arguments are irrelevant to the current setting. The challenges to the single 
monopoly profit theory attempt to demonstrate that when two markets are 
involved, a seller may, under certain circumstances, use its power in one market 
to increase its market power in another market. But this does not challenge the 
idea that when the link of production for the same product is being considered, 
the vertical relationship between an upstream firm and a downstream firm is a 
zero-sum game. 
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Later writings on exclusivity qualified this extreme 
version of the argument. It has been shown that customers 
may be induced to participate in a monopoly-creating 
scheme.121 But importantly, the key point made by Bork and 
Posner—that in the regular setting anti-competitive 
exclusivity harms the entities granting exclusivity—remains 
uncontested.122 Specifically, it has been shown that a 
collective action problem amongst economic agencies at the 
level in the chain of production granting exclusivity 
(retailers, in the previous example) may result in anti-
competitive exclusivity arrangements being struck. If a 
seller need not foreclose all existing retail outlets in order to 
preempt entry, a buyers’ collective action problem emerges. 
Although it is in their best interest to withhold their consent 
to a foreclosure scheme that will result in higher prices 
charged to them, buyers may ultimately participate in it for 
a price that fails to compensate them for their future 
losses.123 Each buyer faces the dilemma of either committing 
to exclusivity for a payment or risking ultimately facing a 
monopolistic seller without having received any 
compensation at all. Consider, for example, an industry in 
which recovering the fixed costs of production requires 
serving at least a quarter of the market.124 A seller can thus 
drive out all potential competitors by signing exclusivity 
contracts with only 75.1% of the buyers. Acting as a group, 
buyers will undoubtedly turn down the offer, and allow 
competition between four sellers to drive prices down. But 
buyers do not decide or act as a group. Each individual buyer 
realizes that if three-quarters of the buyers grant the seller 
exclusivity, a monopoly will have been established. Knowing 
 
 121. See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1204–05. 
 122. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 123. For a less formal exposition of this result, see Louis Kaplow, Extension of 
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 532 (1985). 
 124. On the concept of fixed costs, see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 88, at 
29–33. On the concept of “minimum efficient scale” [of production], see id. at 41–
42. 
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this, each individual buyer will prefer to sign an exclusivity 
contract in return for a payment, rather than ultimately pay 
the monopoly price for no compensation at all. Thus, not only 
can the seller acquire a monopoly by compensating only 
slightly more than three-quarters of the buyers for their 
future losses, it can in fact offer even those buyers less than 
full compensation. A race to the bottom among buyers will 
result in enough buyers agreeing to exclusivity, even if they 
are not fully compensated for their future loss, for fear of 
facing the same result with no remuneration at all.125 
The upshot of the qualification to the Chicago School 
analysis is that in the intuitive case of exclusivity that simply 
forecloses the market to competitors, exclusivity 
arrangements carry anti-competitive potential if, and, 
importantly, only if, there is a collective action problem 
among buyers. Contrary to intuition, anti-competitive 
exclusivity does not benefit both parties to these kinds of 
exclusivity arrangements. While the seller, or the party being 
granted (anti-competitive) exclusivity is better off as a result 
of the exclusives, the parties granting exclusivity are made 
worse off as a result. It is the collective action problem among 
buyers that allows this result.126 As a practical matter, this 
 
 125. I use the term “race to the bottom” rather than “competition” to describe 
buyers’ conduct. The reason is that the end result is worse (from the buyers’ 
perspective) than under competition. Under competition, buyers—at least those 
who ultimately sign exclusivity agreements—will receive their marginal cost, 
namely their difference between the post- and pre- exclusivity prices multiplied 
by their respective expected quantity (and capitalized, if the payment takes the 
form of a lump sum). In the setting described here, buyers may receive a sum 
lower than their marginal cost. See supra note 11. 
 126. This analysis ignores competition among potential sellers to become the 
monopoly, or “competition for the market.” Such competition may counter the 
collective action problem at the buyers’ level, and result in sellers offering larger 
payments for exclusivity. See, e.g., Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Trib. Co., 103 
F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Dir. of Investigation & Rsch. v. D&B Cos. of Can. 
Ltd. (Nielsen) [1995] C.C.T.D. No. 20, 64 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (Can. Ont. C.C.T.D.). At 
the extreme, sellers may share all of their prospective rents with downstream 
buyers. But even under such circumstances, only some of the buyers will be 
compensated for their prospective losses. More importantly, in real-life settings 
the tension between sellers’ competition and buyers’ collective action problem 
2021] ANTITRUST LAW’S HARM 1135 
qualification may not seem important, since most industries 
involve more than a single buyer and a single seller. So, it 
would seem that there is almost always potential for a 
collective action problem, and consequently for anti-
competitive exclusivity. And indeed, the important practical 
implications of this specific prerequisite for anti-competitive 
exclusivity have thus far been overlooked. Although the 
theoretical understanding of exclusivity is now more than 
three decades old, this has not impacted the courts’ analysis 
of exclusivity in any meaningful way. However, as I will 
subsequently show, this has extremely important 
implications for the analysis. 
III. “MONOPOLY OVER MONOPOLY STATUS” – THE NATURAL 
CHECK ON ANTI-COMPETITIVE EXCLUSIVITY 
Against the backdrop of exclusivity’s welfare-enhancing 
potential, it is important to carefully examine the contours of 
its anti-competitive potential. Specifically, it is important to 
understand under what circumstances exclusivity has 
limited or no potential for being anti-competitive. As 
exclusivity can always achieve pro-competitive goals, the 
rule of reason analysis must focus on identifying 
circumstances under which it is likely to be anti-competitive. 
Antitrust law has already identified certain categories of 
such circumstances. For example, the rule according to 
which exclusivity foreclosing extremely small market shares 
will almost automatically be upheld is such a rule. It is based 
on the uncontested understanding that the anti-competitive 
potential is largely curbed under such circumstances.127 
Similarly, the idea that if barriers to entry are not high, 
exclusivity should raise little concern, is again a balancing 
 
may result in some midway equilibrium in which buyers are under-compensated, 
albeit less so than under no competition among sellers. Finally, one can think of 
circumstances in which there is no competition, or little competition, among 
sellers to become the monopoly. For example, if there is only one seller who is 
capable of serving the whole market. 
 127. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 435–37; see also infra note 148. 
1136 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
act within the framework of the rule of reason.128 If barriers 
to entry are low, there is no reason to think that exclusivity 
may inhibit competition. Higher prices will attract entry into 
the market. Under such circumstances, exclusivity’s welfare-
enhancing potential far outweighs its anti-competitive 
potential. In view of the preceding analysis, another such 
rule should be put in place. Surprisingly, this rule pertains 
to the setting of extremely large foreclosure. 
A. Industries in which Forestalling Competition Requires 
Foreclosure of All Outlets 
In view of the preceding analysis, it should be clear by 
now that industries in which all outlets must be foreclosed in 
order to forestall competition are industries in which there is 
limited scope for anti-competitive exclusivity. Anti-
competitive exclusivity of the kind discussed here is not even 
a theoretical option in such industries. The question is only 
whether such industries are common. As will be shown, they 
are. 
First, consider the extreme case of a single buyer, a 
monopsony, granting exclusivity to a seller. The share of the 
market that has been foreclosed is 100%. There is a single 
buyer, who has committed to purchase all its needs from a 
specific seller. The sellers’ competitors cannot make any 
sales at all. However, perhaps counter-intuitively, this is a 
case that should raise no competitive concern. There is no 
collective action problem, because there is only one economic 
agent capable of granting exclusivity. Such a monopsony has 
no concern that its competitors will grant exclusivity and 
leave it facing a monopolistic seller. If a monopsony grants a 
seller exclusivity, it cannot be allowing its seller to 
subsequently raise prices, unless the seller fully 
compensates the monopsony for its future loss, which would 
mean that the seller has gained nothing from the agreement. 
 
 128. On the balancing act (and skepticism regarding its efficacy), see Posner, 
supra note 20. 
2021] ANTITRUST LAW’S HARM 1137 
The only plausible explanation in this setting is that 
exclusivity achieves one or more of the welfare-enhancing 
goals previously discussed, leaving both parties to the 
transaction (and society as a whole) better off. An anti-
competitive explanation is not persuasive. In these settings, 
Bork’s stipulation that “there is every reason to believe that 
exclusive dealing and requirements contracts have no 
purpose or effect other than the creation of efficiency”129 
seems convincing with respect to exclusivity agreements 
designed to foreclose markets. 
Next, the analysis can be extended to cases that do not 
involve a monopoly (or monopsony) granting exclusivity. 
There are other cases in which there is no collective action 
problem among the firm or firms granting exclusivity. This 
is the case, for example, in an industry in which foreclosing 
the market requires foreclosing all existing outlets. Each 
buyer is then indispensable if the market is to be foreclosed 
to the seller’s competitors, and there is again no collective 
action problem. An industry in which foreclosure requires 
the acquiescence of all retailers may seem rare. But in 
reality, this is probably more common than it would seem. 
Any industry in which one retailer or more has enough 
volume to sustain an upstream manufacturer will meet this 
criterion. Consider the case of an industry with eight 
retailers of (more or less) equal size, in which an upstream 
enterprise is viable if it serves 8%, 9%, or even 10% of the 
market. As each of the retailers’ market share is 12.5%, each 
can sustain an upstream seller. There is no collective action 
problem. No single retailer faces the risk of ultimately facing 
a monopoly if it does not grant exclusivity. 
Although the specific numeric values presented here are 
stylized, and designed to illustrate the point, settings in 
which all outlets are essential for forestalling competition 
seem extremely common. This may be the case in industries 
with a handful of large outlets, in industries with quite a few 
 
 129. BORK, supra note 11, at 309. 
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medium-size outlets, and in industries in which there are 
numerous small outlets. Several prominent examples of such 
settings are provided below. In such settings, each of the 
retailers is indispensable if the manufacturer wants to 
foreclose the market to its competitors. Similar to the setting 
of an industry with a single buyer, there is no collective 
action problem at the buyers’ level. There is no scope for anti-
competitive exclusivity of the kind discussed here. 
In these settings, each retailer possesses a monopoly 
over the seller’s monopoly status, that is similar to the 
monopoly the single buyer had in the previous example. 
Importantly, monopoly over the seller’s monopoly status does 
not require a monopoly in the relevant product or geographic 
market. The point made here is precisely that a number of 
retailers may each have this monopoly over the seller’s 
monopoly status, even if none of them can in any way be 
considered dominant in the product market. Each of them 
can withhold monopoly status from the seller to whom they 
grant exclusivity. The consideration each retailer will 
demand for such exclusivity will fall between that retailer’s 
prospective losses and the full monopoly rents the 
manufacturer expects to earn. None of the retailers will 
grant exclusivity for less than its share of the prospective 
monopoly overcharge (in the numeric example used here, 
12.5% of the overcharge). And some may demand up to the 
full amount of monopoly rents that the seller is expected to 
extract. If all eight retailers demand the bare minimum—
their respective share of the overcharge—nothing will have 
been gained through anti-competitive exclusivity. Neither 
the manufacturer nor any of the retailers will be any better 
off. If any of the retailers demands even trivially more than 
its prospective share of the monopoly overcharge, the 
exclusivity program will become detrimental to the 
manufacturer (who can then, of course, be expected to 
abandon the whole endeavor). Anti-competitive exclusivity of 
the kind discussed here is impossible not only when 
exclusivity is agreed to by a monopsony, but also when it is 
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granted in an industry in which all retail establishments can 
sustain an upstream business. 
B. Industries in which Forestalling Competition Requires 
Foreclosure of Large Market Shares 
The case for allowing exclusivity that forecloses 
extremely large market shares is, in fact, even stronger than 
the previous analyses suggest. The analysis can be 
broadened, and can be applied to settings in which not all 
retailers can withhold the monopoly status from the seller. 
The more retailers are able to withhold the status from the 
seller, the less probable anti-competitive exclusivity 
becomes. 
To see why, let us begin with a theoretical possibility. If 
not all buyers have a monopoly over monopoly status, anti-
competitive exclusivity is reintroduced as a theoretical 
construct. The reason is that those retailers who cannot 
withhold the status from the seller may be exploited. A 
retailer’s acquiescence to anti-competitive exclusivity creates 
a negative externality on other retailers. And this negative 
externality can be harnessed to benefit both the seller and 
the acquiescing buyer or buyers. Consider an industry with 
ten buyers, eight of whom are essential for blocking 
competitors. The previous analysis will hold with respect to 
these retailers. None of them can be taken advantage of. But 
as some of the monopoly overcharge is charged to the two 
other buyers, it may be possible to compensate all eight 
buyers for their prospective losses, and nonetheless profit 
from charging the two other retailers monopoly prices. 
Therefore, theoretically, anti-competitive exclusivity 
may still be possible as long as not all buyers possess 
monopoly over monopoly status. But because it is only the 
non-essential retailers that can be exploited, and because the 
profits derived from exploiting these retailers must be 
shared with all essential retailers (as well as the 
manufacturer), there is a practical limit on the viability of 
anti-competitive exclusivity. Specifically, the more buyers 
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are able to withhold the status from the seller, the less likely 
anti-competitive exclusivity becomes. There are several 
reasons for this. First, there is an inherent tension between 
the viability of the anti-competitive scheme and its 
profitability. The viability of the scheme is largely contingent 
on the non-exclusive buyers’ total market share being small. 
If their market share is not small, they will be able to sustain 
the competitors’ business, and are therefore essential for 
exclusivity. At the same time, the profitability of the scheme 
depends on the non-exclusive buyers jointly holding a large 
market share. Otherwise, given that the exclusive buyers 
need to be fully compensated, the scheme will not be 
profitable. 
In the scenario described here of eight buyers agreeing 
to exclusivity, the market share of the two remaining 
competitors must be small enough that they cannot sustain 
the manufacturer’s competitors. Otherwise, foreclosing the 
eight retailers will not exclude a competitor. The ability to 
sustain the business of a competing manufacturer depends 
chiefly on these two buyers’ total volume of sales. So, in order 
for the exclusivity plan to achieve its anti-competitive goal, 
the joint market share of these two retailers must be 
relatively small. But the profitability of anti-competitive 
exclusivity depends mostly on these retailers’ market share 
being large enough so that their exploitation—the marginal 
increase in the price they are charged as a result of the 
establishment of a monopoly—generates enough profit to 
share between the artificially-created monopoly and the 
other eight retailers. In other words, in order for the scheme 
to be possible, the exploited retailers’ share must be small. 
But in order for the scheme to be profitable, the exploited 
retailers’ market share must be large. The tension between 
the viability of the scheme and its profitability thus makes 
anti-competitive exclusivity far less likely. 
A second reason for why anti-competitive exclusivity 
becomes less likely as the market share required for 
forestalling competition increases has to do with a problem 
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that is well known in closely related contexts—the double 
marginalization problem.130 As the number of retailers that 
are essential for blocking competitors increases, so does the 
likelihood that at least some of them will demand a share of 
the supra-competitive rents that makes the whole endeavor 
unprofitable from the manufacturer’s perspective. Even if 
some of them demand only trivially more than their 
respective loss, the aggregate may make the whole scheme 
unprofitable.131 Once again, in the example of the ten-
retailer industry described here, if each of the eight retailers 
demand a seventh of the monopoly overcharge, the scheme 
will not be profitable.132 
Finally, transaction costs must be accounted for. 
Agreeing to anti-competitive exclusivity can be expected to 
be extremely costly. Each economic agent granting 
exclusivity must accurately assess its share of the expected 
overcharge, as must the party being granted exclusivity. This 
entails both assessing the expected monopolistic overcharge 
and addressing potential future fluctuations in each of the 
exclusive retailers’ market shares. If any of the exclusive 
retailers’ market share changes during the duration of the 
exclusivity commitment, its share of the overcharge will 
change, as will the share of the competing retailer or 
retailers whose market share has decreased or increased. 
Accounting for these contingencies seems extremely costly. 
And the more retailers there are that can withhold monopoly 
status from the manufacturer, the more costly exclusivity 
becomes, because an exclusivity agreement must be struck 
 
 130. Double marginalization regularly occurs in product markets in which 
each of two successive monopolies in the chain of production disregards the effect 
their pricing has on the other, resulting in prices that are above the optimal level, 
to the detriment of both monopolies. See Spengler, supra note 116. 
 131. The uniqueness of the current setting is that the two (or, more likely, the 
several) monopolies are in fact competitors in the product market. They are 
successive monopolies only with respect to their monopoly over the seller’s 
monopoly status. 




14% more than it can afford to. 
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with each retailer. 
Thus, although anti-competitive exclusivity of the kind 
discussed by Chicago School theorists is theoretically 
possible if competition can be forestalled without the 
acquiescence of all retailers, it becomes extremely unlikely 
as the market share required to forestall competition reaches 
very large market shares. The extremely small profits 
derived from the non-exclusive share of the market will have 
to be divided among a large number of participants; any one 
of a large number of retailers attempting to extract even 
trivially more than the precise amount of its expected 
overcharge will jeopardize the profitability of the scheme; 
and the contingencies that will have to be addressed with 
precision will, at the very least, largely increase transaction 
costs. 
The implications of this analysis can be demonstrated in 
several prominent billion-dollar industries in which current 
theory and doctrine suggest that exclusivity may be 
problematic. As will be shown, large-scale exclusivity is 
unlikely to be anti-competitive in these industries, and 
should in fact be presumed benign. 
C. Exclusivity in the Real World 
Several prominent real-life industries demonstrate how 
the current (mis)understanding of exclusivity disallows 
parties to reach welfare-enhancing agreements, resulting in 
a social loss. Specifically, these industries demonstrate that 
while foreclosure of a 60% to 70% market share may indeed 
be designed to forestall competition, foreclosure of 85% to 
90% is unlikely to be anti-competitive. 
1. Exclusivity in E-Commerce 
Exclusivity arrangements signed with large e-retailers 
such as Amazon have recently come under attack worldwide. 
Although the welfare-enhancing potential of these 
arrangements is not contested, the concern is that they may 
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inhibit competition and ultimately raise prices to 
consumers.133 Some antitrust authorities have even banned 
certain kinds of exclusivity arrangements in the e-commerce 
sector altogether.134 A closer look at the sector shows that the 
competitive concerns are misplaced. 
According to a July 2018 report by eMarketer, the ten 
largest US online retailers account for 70.1% of this over-
$525 billion industry. The four largest retailers account for 
approximately 63% of sales.135 Exclusivity arrangements 
foreclosing a 60% to 70% market share may indeed be anti-
competitive. At least with respect to some products, for which 
fixed costs (such as R&D, marketing, and logistical costs) are 
significant, it stands to reason that a wholesaler must have 
presence in at least one of the four largest retailers in order 
for its business to be viable. Thus, a wholesaler that signs 
exclusivity agreements with these four retailers, may 
thereby block its competitors’ access to the market. The four 
retailers’ acquiescence to this anti-competitive scheme is also 
plausible. They may have agreed to anti-competitive 
exclusivity and received remuneration for their share of the 
expected overcharge. The higher prices to be charged to the 
remaining 40% of the market provide a revenue stream that 
would allow both the wholesaler and the four large retailers 
to benefit from the elimination of competition. 
But let us now consider a wholesaler who, due to the cost 
structure in its industry, must foreclose significantly larger 
market shares, say 90%, in order to block its competitors’ 
 
 133. See, e.g., Report From The Commission To The Council And The European 
Parliament: Final Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, para. 26, COM (2017) 
229 final (May 10, 2017). Note, that the analysis focuses on selective distribution 
systems, which are the practical equivalent of an exclusivity commitment. See id. 
paras. 9–22. 
 134. See, e.g., Aftab Ahmed & Sankalp Phartiyal, India Tightens E-commerce 
Rules, Likely to Hit Amazon, Flipkart, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2018, 1:11 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-ecommerce-idUSKCN1OP14M. 
 135. Corey McNair, Top 10 US Ecommerce Companies in 2018, EMARKETER 
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.emarketer.com/content/top-10-us-ecommerce-
companies-in-2018. 
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access to the market. As mentioned, the ten largest retailers 
account for 70.1% of the market, out of which the four largest 
retailers account for 63%. The six retailers that are next in 
line in terms of size thus account for a total of approximately 
7% of the market, or slightly more than 1% on average. And 
a large number of retailers who do not rank among the top 
ten retailers in terms of size obviously hold market shares of 
less than 1% (or $5.25 billion in dollar terms) on average.136 
Foreclosing the market to the wholesaler’s competitors 
would require the acquiescence of tens, if not hundreds, of 
retailers. If that is the case, anti-competitive exclusivity 
becomes practically impossible. There would be tens, or 
hundreds, of “monopolists” (with power over the seller’s 
market power) that would need to be brought on board, each 
making its own demand (and possibly overcharging the 
wholesaler). The costs of foreclosure would be unimaginable. 
Reaching an agreement with numerous retailers and 
compensating each of them for their future share of the 
overcharge would require assessing each retailer’s expected 
share of the overcharge, and agreeing on compensation. 
Importantly, it would require bargaining ex ante with 
numerous retailers for the calibration of compensation in 
case of fluctuations in sales’ volume. Even very small 
changes in market shares in this dynamic industry would 
require major changes in compensation. Compensation paid 
to a retailer whose market share increased from 0.5% to 
0.6%, a change that is unlikely to be significant from the 
wholesaler’s perspective, would have to be recalibrated. 
Otherwise, that retailer would be paying an 
(uncompensated) monopoly overcharge for twenty percent of 
its purchases. This recalibration would, in turn, require 
recalibration of the compensation paid to a competitor whose 
market share had shrunk. If the latter were not recalibrated, 
the wholesaler would be overpaying for exclusivity. And the 
changes to compensation in each of these contingencies 
 
 136. See id. 
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would have to be bargained for ex ante. This seems almost 
imaginary. And even if it were somehow accomplished, the 
market share that would remain for exploitation would be 
extremely small. Presumably, only a handful of retailers 
whose market shares are trivial could not sustain a 
competing enterprise. And it is only these retailers that could 
be exploited. 
Ultimately, anti-competitive exclusivity foreclosing 60% 
to 70% of the market seems plausible. Anti-competitive 
exclusivity foreclosing 90% to 95% of the market is virtually 
impossible.137 If exclusivity arrangements foreclosing 90% of 
the market are observed, the reason is likely some welfare-
enhancing goal that these arrangements achieve. 
Surprisingly, foreclosure of very large market shares 
provides a safeguard against anti-competitive exclusivity, 
not a factor worsening the competitive situation. 
2. The Food-Retail Industry in Canada 
The Canadian food-retail industry is also illuminating in 
this respect. According to a report published in 2017, this $85 
billion industry is dominated by three firms—Loblaw, Metro, 
and Sobeys—whose combined market share is estimated to 
be approximately 60%.138 The Canadian Competition Act 
would make exclusivity arrangements signed by any of these 
major suppliers actionable.139 But independent retailers hold 
a stable market share of approximately 40%, amounting to 
 
 137. Of course, foreclosure of smaller magnitude may prevent some 
competitors from entering, but this will not change the analysis. The rents will 
be smaller, and the seller will be willing to pay less for exclusivity. Additionally, 
coordination problems among the sellers that were not excluded would emerge. 
 138. USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., RETAIL FOODS: THE RETAIL LANDSCAPE OF 
CANADA 5 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20 
Publications/Retail%20Foods_Ottawa_Canada_2-15-2017.pdf; QUEEN’S UNIV. 
INV. COUNS., CANADIAN GROCERY MARKET REPORT: A FRESH LOOK AT SOME 
APPETIZING INVESTMENTS 3 (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.quiconline.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/CH-Canadian-Grocery-Report-01.16.17.pdf. 
 139. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 § 77 (Can.). 
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$31 billion of sales in 2017.140 Among these independent 
retailers are many mom-and-pop type stores that have no 
affiliation with a wholesaler.141 And chain discount retailers 
such as Costco and Walmart have also significantly 
increased their market share in recent years.142 If exclusivity 
is signed with the “Big Three” and perhaps with Costco and 
Walmart, resulting in foreclosure of 60% to 75%, one might 
believe that the market was anti-competitively foreclosed. 
Again, the industry may be such that a seller must serve at 
least one of these five large retailers for its business to be 
sustainable. Foreclosing all of these outlets may prevent 
competition, and allow the contracting parties to share the 
profits by exploiting the remaining retailers. But if 
independent retailers are sufficient to sustain a competitor, 
foreclosure of 90% and higher becomes a pre-requisite for 
anti-competitive exclusivity. The idea that hundreds or 
thousands of arrangements are being signed for the benefit 
of exploiting several retailers with trivial market shares 
seems uncompelling, at the very least. Once again, 
foreclosure of 70% may be anti-competitive. Foreclosure of 
90% provides comfort that exclusivity is not anti-competitive. 
3. The UK Food and Grocery Industry 
Finally, the UK food and grocery retail industry provides 
another illustrative example. The UK Competition Act 
prohibits agreements preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition.143 This prohibition is interpreted to apply, inter 
alia, to exclusivity agreements, and legal experts explicitly 
caution against any exclusivity arrangement foreclosing 
 
 140. George Condon, The 2017 Annual Market Survey, CANADIAN GROCER 
(Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.canadiangrocer.com/research/the-2017-annual-
market-survey-79472. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.; QUEEN’S UNIV. INV. COUNS., supra note 138, at 3. 
 143. Competition Act 1998, c. 41 § 2 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1998/41/contents. 
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market shares of over 30%.144 
But a look at the food and grocery retail industry 
suggests that widespread exclusivity in this industry should 
raise very little concern. Each of the ten major competitors—
Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda, Morrisons, Aldi, Co-Op, Lidl, 
Waitrose, Iceland, and Ocado145—is indispensable if an 
exclusivity scheme is to exclude a producer’s competitors. 
These competitors account for a total of over 96% of this £180 
billion industry, and even the smallest of these major 
retailers holds a market share of 1.4%,146 accounting for 
approximately £2.5 billion in sales. It is hard to see how anti-
competitive exclusivity can be accomplished. All ten chains 
would have to agree to charging essentially nothing more 
than their expected losses (which would require pinpointing 
the expected overcharge with precision, making transactions 
far more costly), all for the benefit of overcharging the 
remaining 3.5% of retailers. If exclusivity is struck with all 
ten chains, it seems far more likely that a welfare-enhancing 
goal has been achieved. 
IV. FORECLOSURE OF LARGE MARKET SHARES –  
A PRACTICAL RULE 
The preceding analysis suggests that there is an upper 
boundary on exclusivity’s anti-competitive potential. In some 
industries, specifically when exclusivity is granted by a 
monopoly or monopsony, foreclosure of extremely large 
 
 144. Kathryn Rogers, Distribution Agreements and UK/EC Competition Law, 
CRIPPS PEMBERTON GREENISH (June 13, 2017), https://www.crippspg.co.uk 
/distribution-agreements-competition-law-2/. 
 145. See Lidl tops Waitrose to become UK’s seventh biggest grocer, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41011259. With the 
exception of the change in Lidl’s positioning, the 2016 data are not very different. 
See RETAIL ECONOMICS, UK FOOD AND GROCERY SECTOR REPORT 15 (2016), 
https://www.retaileconomics.co.uk/download/Sample%20-%20UK%20Food%20 
and%20Grocery%20Sector.pdf. 
 146. See Lidl tops Waitrose to become UK’s seventh biggest grocer, supra note 
145. 
1148 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
market shares cannot be anti-competitive in the manner 
discussed here, even on a theoretical basis. In most 
industries, exclusivity foreclosing large market shares is 
unlikely to be anti-competitive. Industries with several 
retailers of equal size, none of whom holds a market share 
that is significantly larger than other retailers’ share, are 
industries in which there is no real potential for anti-
competitive exclusivity. 
The current paradigm must be changed. For small and 
medium market shares, the competitive danger posed by 
exclusivity agreements raises as the foreclosed market share 
increases. But for relatively large market shares, the danger 
is reduced as the foreclosed market share increases. Just as 
exclusivity arrangements foreclosing small market shares 
are considered presumptively benign, so should exclusivity 
agreements foreclosing extreme market shares. Foreclosure 
of 100% should, paradoxically, raise less concern than 
foreclosure of 90%. The prevalent (and very intuitive) view 
according to which the competitive danger always increases 
as the foreclosed market share increases,147 is simply wrong. 
The precise percentage from which exclusivity is 
unlikely to produce any anti-competitive outcome depends on 
specific case-by-case factors.148 There is no single percentage 
of foreclosure beyond which exclusivity will never be anti-
competitive. Suggesting a single percentage applicable to all 
industries under all settings would thus be a gross 
 
 147. Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C 
291/01) paras. 21–25; RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 594–98 (5th ed. 2003); 
BARRY J. RODGER & AGNUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 189–95 (2d ed. 2002); CDC 
Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no 
competitive danger despite the large market share foreclosed). 
 148. Such as the industry cost-structure (of both the link in the chain of 
production granting exclusivity and the link in the chain of production being 
granted exclusivity). On other barriers to entry (regulation, industry-specific 
sunk costs, etc.), see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 8888, at 29, 73–82. On 
profit-margins, the length of the exclusivity covenant, and the ease of termination 
of the contract, see Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
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oversimplification. Nonetheless, as in many other areas of 
antitrust law, for practical purposes it is helpful to propose a 
rule of thumb—a tentative upper boundary, beyond which 
exclusivity arrangements should enjoy a refutable 
presumption of legality. 
This percentage can be informed by the experience 
gained over the years with the opposite end of the scale—
foreclosure of insignificant market shares. As will be shown, 
anecdotal empirical analyses covering a large number of 
industries in the United States bolsters the conclusion 
derived from this comparison. 
Antitrust law has long grappled with the lower 
threshold, below which exclusivity arrangements are 
presumed benign. Antitrust theory and law assume, in line 
with traditional analysis of exclusivity arrangements (and 
with the analysis advanced in this Article), that exclusivity 
arrangements foreclosing insignificant market shares raise 
no real competitive concern. Antitrust theory has not 
provided a hard and fast number below which exclusivity 
should be presumed benign, or a framework for producing 
such a number. Nonetheless, antitrust law has provided a 
ballpark figure. Courts almost automatically uphold 
exclusivity arrangements foreclosing market shares of 15% 
to 30%.149 Block Exemptions in the European Union 
 
 149. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Visa U.S.A., No. 04 
Civ.8967(BSJ), 2005 WL 1515399, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005) (“Generally 
speaking, cases construing Jefferson Parish have held that an agreement must 
foreclose at least 30 percent to 40 percent of the market to support a § 1 violation, 
and one treatise advises that there thus exists a ‘virtual safe harbor . . . for 
market foreclosure of 20 percent or less.’”); ZF Meritor, L.L.C. v. Eaton Corp., 696 
F.3d 254, 326 (3d Cir. 2012); Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 191 F. Supp. 
3d 694, 702 (W.D. Ky. 2016); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 837 (11th Cir. 
2015) (“Traditionally a foreclosure percentage of at least 40% has been a 
threshold for liability in exclusive dealing cases.”); Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, 
Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997). Even courts willing to set the threshold 
at a lower percentage have normally relied on aggravating factors, and have not 
generally struck down exclusivity arrangements foreclosing less than 20%. See 
Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. L.P., No. OV 02-4770 MRP, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29977, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2004) (relying on Twin City 
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finely & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982) 
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specifically mention 30% as a threshold under which 
exclusivity arrangements are presumed benign.150 This may 
be mirrored in the context of extreme foreclosure. Of course, 
caution must be taken when instating a new rule of thumb, 
so that it is not overly inclusive. As a conservative measure, 
it seems appropriate to use the lower end of the 15% to 30% 
range. Just as foreclosure of market shares of 15% or less 
enjoy a ‘safe harbor,’ foreclosure of 85% and higher should 
presumptively be considered benign. 
The 85% threshold is supported by a study covering a 
wide range of industries. In an article published in March of 
2014, The Economist divided the US economy into 893 
sectors, covered by America’s five-year economic census. The 
Economist found that the weighted average share of the four 
largest firms in each sector was 32%.151 The average market 
share of a large firm is thus 8%. This, in turn, implies that 
normally, when a market share of 85% and higher has been 
foreclosed, only one large firm in the industry will not have 
committed to exclusivity. If all large firms but one, as well as 
a large number of smaller firms, have committed to 
exclusivity, the analysis developed in this Article suggests 
that the probability that exclusivity is anti-competitive is 
extremely small. Thus, exclusivity foreclosing an 85% 
market share and higher should be considered competitively 
benign. 
This presumption of pro-competitiveness must be 
refutable. This is so for three main reasons: First, further 
empirical research is called for. Although the survey on 
 
(striking down arrangements foreclosing a 24% market share)). 
 150. Commission Regulation 330/2010 of Apr. 20, 2010 on the Application of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 1; 
Commission Regulation 2790/99, supra note 22, at 3; see also Israel’s Block 
Exemption Rule For Vertical Non-Price Agreements, 25/07/2013 (Publication 
Num. 500434). 
 151. Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-
needs-giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing. 
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which the analysis is based is a comprehensive one, covering 
nearly nine hundred industries, it is nonetheless a single 
survey. Future systematic research may call for a change of 
the specific percentage. 
Second, even if the findings of this survey are confirmed 
by future research, the survey suggests an average figure. 
The precise percentage from which large foreclosure provides 
a safeguard will change from industry to industry based on 
each industry’s characteristics. 
One obvious factor that would change the specific 
percentage in different industries is the number of 
competitors in the industry.152 The smaller the number of 
firms in the market, the larger the average size of these 
firms. This implies that for a given foreclosure rate necessary 
for the elimination of competition, the smaller the number of 
firms in the market, the smaller the probability of anti-
competitive exclusivity. This is so because there is more 
likely to be more than one firm that has a monopoly over 
monopoly status. For example, in an industry in which 
forestalling competition requires foreclosure of 75.1% of the 
market, anti-competitive foreclosure is possible if there are 
one hundred retailers with equal market shares (because 
foreclosure can be achieved even if as many as twenty-four 
retailers decline the exclusivity offer). It is less likely to occur 
 
 152. I do not use the term “concentration ratio,” as in the present context it is 
important to decouple two elements of concentration—the number of firms, and 
the distribution of size among these firms. In the most commonly used index, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, concentration rises the larger the average size of 
the firms (measured in terms of market share) and the greater the differentiation 
between the firms in terms of size. In the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), 
which is one instance of the general CRK test (𝐶𝑅𝐾 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝐾𝐼=1 ), the distribution of 
size positively impacts concentration indirectly, because the total size of the 
largest firms can be expected to be greater the greater the inequality in 
distribution. See generally B. Curry & K. D. George, Industrial Concentration: A 
Survey, 31 J. INDUST. ECON. 203, 204–10 (1983). As Curry & George note, values 
of three to eight are usually employed. Id. For a less formal description of the two 
most common indices and a discussion of their shortcomings and relative 
advantages, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 456–63 (2d ed. 
1999). 
1152 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
if there are six, seven, or eight retailers of equal size (because 
only one retailer is expendable if a manufacturer attempts to 
foreclose the market). And it is impossible if there are four 
retailers or less. 
Another factor affecting the likelihood of anti-
competitive exclusivity, closely related to the previous one, 
focuses not on the number of firms in the market, but rather 
on the distribution of size among these firms. This is 
important because for any given number of firms, the more 
uniform the distribution of market shares among the larger 
firms in the industry, the less likely anti-competitive 
exclusivity becomes. As explained, when market shares are 
relatively similar, all entities are likely to be essential for 
forestalling competition. By contrast, when there is a single 
dominant firm whose market share is large but not extreme, 
and other smaller firms, anti-competitive exclusivity is more 
likely. The smaller firms may be exploited. In an industry 
with four competitors of equal size, anti-competitive 
exclusivity is unlikely. In an industry with four competitors, 
three of whom have a 10% market share and one of whom 
holds 70% of the market, anti-competitive exclusivity is 
plausible. 
Due to the fact that the precise percentage is based on a 
single study, and given the potential differences between 
industries, the 85% threshold advocated here should not be 
irrefutable. Plaintiffs should be allowed to produce evidence 
rebutting this presumption under specific market 
circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the 85% figure is not engraved 
in stone should not dissuade policy makers from adopting 
such a figure as a default rule. The use of workable rule-of-
thumb values is in no way foreign to antitrust analysis, and 
is in fact the norm in antitrust enforcement. Similar rule-of-
thumb values that are not precise in the same sense are used 
in various contexts of antitrust law. For example, in the 
context of product market definition, the test adopted by the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission is the 
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‘hypothetical monopoly test,’ which seeks to determine the 
profitability of a “small but significant non-transitory 
increase in price” (SSNIP). The “small but significant” 
element of this test is generally translated to mean a 5% 
increase in price.153 This figure is also inaccurate in the same 
sense.154 “Small but significant” could have been translated 
to mean 2.5% or 15%. Similarly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) is used to assess the probable effects of 
horizontal mergers on market concentration. Within the 
framework of the HHI, the government sets general 
standards: it considers markets in which the post-merger 
HHI is less than 1500 to be unconcentrated, markets in 
which the post-merger HHIs are between 1500 and 2500 to 
be moderately concentrated, and markets in which post-
merger HHIs are above 2500 to be highly concentrated.155 
These values are not based on any precise analysis. Again, 
one could just as easily have supported a stipulation of 2000 
HHI-points as the upper boundary of moderately 
concentrated markets. The government also considers a 100 
HHI-point increase in a moderately concentrated market 
and a 200 HHI-point increase in a highly concentrated 
market to potentially raise significant competitive concerns 
(in the former case) or be likely to enhance market power (in 
the latter case). This precise quantification is imprecise, if 
not arbitrary. Different market shares are also used in 
attempted monopolization and in illegal monopolization 
cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Finally, in the 
present context of exclusivity arrangements, the 40% 
threshold for condemnation is not inherently more 
 
 153. U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES  
4.1.2 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010. 
 154. And indeed, the FTC and DOJ reserve the right to use a different figure: 
“However, what constitutes a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ increase 
in price, commensurate with a significant loss of competition caused by the 
merger, depends upon the nature of the industry and the merging firms’ positions 
in it, and the Agencies may accordingly use a price increase that is larger or 
smaller than five percent.” Id. 
 155. Id. at 5.3. 
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compelling than a 35% one. 
Thus, the setting of an 85% threshold is not itself 
objectionable. But as it is imprecise, the presumption of 
legality for foreclosure exceeding this threshold must be 
refutable.156 Industries may exist in which a collective action 
problem is prevalent even when the foreclosed market share 
reaches levels of 90% and higher.157 
A final reason for why the presumption should not be 
irrefutable is that actual foreclosure levels are not 
necessarily indicative of the foreclosure levels that are 
required for the elimination of competition. Consider, for 
example, an industry in which foreclosure of 92% is observed. 
The industry may theoretically be one in which the 
elimination of competition requires the foreclosure of only 
65%. And if this is the case, the industry is one in which the 
presumption of pro-competitiveness should not be invoked. It 
is of course unclear why exclusivity arrangements would be 
struck with 92% of the market if 65% are enough to foreclose 
the market. But theoretically, the additional agreements, 
while redundant in terms of forestalling competition, may 
have been signed in order to invoke the presumption of 
legality and conceal the fact that 65% of the market were 
sufficient to forestall competition.158 
 
 156. Melamed, supra note 110, at 376, points to the inflexibility that has 
resulted from the focus on the lower threshold in the present context: 
“…[A]lthough rules of thumb like a specified percent foreclosure test are not 
unrelated to the competition issues raised by exclusive dealing agreements, they 
are often too wooden and inflexible to provide a sound basis for decision.” 
 157. Of course, there may be cases in which collective action problems exist 
even when the elimination of competition requires foreclosure of 99%. 
Theoretically, if each of 100 retailers holds a 1% market share, the collective 
action problem will prevail even if the elimination of competition requires 
foreclosure of 99%. But as a practical matter this seems like an unrealistic 
qualification: if any of the retailers holds a market share that is even marginally 
greater (say, 1.01%), the collective action problem will be spontaneously 
eliminated and there will be a natural check on anti-competitive exclusivity. 
Additionally, hold-out problems and transaction costs make it far more difficult 
to achieve foreclosure under these circumstances. 
 158. Once the monopoly has been secured by virtue of the 65% foreclosure, 
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Notwithstanding its proposed refutability, exclusivity 
arrangements foreclosing market shares in excess of 85% 
should, counter-intuitively, enjoy a presumption of pro-
competitiveness. At extremely large foreclosed market 
shares, the probability that exclusivity arrangements are 
being used to an anti-competitive end decreases 
dramatically, and it becomes far more likely that their 
intended and actual effects are welfare enhancing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contemporary antitrust doctrine routinely, and in fact 
almost automatically, condemns exclusivity arrangements 
foreclosing extremely large market shares.159 Antitrust 
doctrine is, in this respect, in line with antitrust theory 
which has surprisingly overlooked a key upshot of the 
understanding that anti-competitive exclusivity can 
normally be achieved only if a collective action problem exists 
among the entities granting exclusivity. 
The argument pressed in this Article is that within the 
framework of the rule of reason, courts should be mindful of 
the fact that exclusion of competitors through exclusivity 
agreements is unlikely not only when the foreclosed market 
share is relatively small, but also when the foreclosed market 
share is extremely large. Contemporary antitrust law 
wrongly condemns such arrangements. An immeasurable 
number of welfare-enhancing business arrangements are 
nipped in the bud. 
 
additional outlets seem to have little reason to resist an offer to sign exclusivity 
agreements, at least in terms of enhancement of monopoly power. 
 159. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
